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Mitkä olivat Afrikan diasporan itse kokemat roolit sekä motivaatio osallistumiselleen, mitä esteitä he kokivat 
osallistumiselleen ja millä keinoin he pyrkivät saamaan äänensä kuuluviin? 2) Kuinka ymmärrys diaspora-
identiteetistä vaikutti post-2015 prosessin deliberatiivisuuteen Suomessa?  
 
Tutkimustulosten perusteella vain muutama aktiivinen diaspora-toimija nähtiin mukana post-2015 agendan 
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1 Introduction 
“Cooperation with the diaspora in rebuilding the country [Somalia] is essential – our 
advice is to involve every Somali in building peace” stated former Finnish Development 
minister Pekka Haavisto in 2013 (Formin, 2013a). During past decades, 3.6 % of the 
Finnish population has immigrated to the country (Family Federation, 2014). This 
research assesses how African diaspora communities in Finland reflect their 
participation on decision making. It aims to seek who represents these communities in 
Finland and what motivates the diaspora to act. It gives voice for those often unheard on 
the public debates and reasons hindering factors for their participation. Despite the 
rhetoric’s of Mr. Haavisto, there seems to be fairly few mechanisms to enable the 
diaspora into deliberation.  
 
The current debate around migration sees immigrants often as passive and inactive 
receivers of support. During the past years there has been a shift away from this in order 
to emphasize the role of active immigrants.  Rather than using the term immigrant, I 
will use a term diaspora that further emphasizes the active role of the immigrants. I refer 
with diasporas to “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host 
countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of 
origin.” (Sheffer, 1986, p. 3). Not all immigrants choose to maintain linkages with their 
countries of origin, and out of those who do, only few of them choose to engage with 
advocacy work (Newland, 2010).  
 
During the time of this research, a global post-2015 development agenda was under 
construction. The post-2015 agenda aims to create universal sustainable development 
goals (SDGs) that would be based on the eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The MDGs have had a significant impact on the development field; states, 
multilaterals, businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been 
working towards achieving these goals by the year 2015 (Fukuda-Parr, 2012) (Fukuda-
Parr & Hulme, 2009) (Hulme & Wilkinson, 2012). Universalism of this new post-2015 
agenda forces rich, middle-income countries, such as Finland, to consider the agenda on 
their policy priorities. The post-2015 agenda setting is a United Nations (UN) member 
state led process, which was declared to be an open, and one that would include agenda 
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setting in civil society, academia and the private sector. It emphasizes the importance of 
harnessing the voices of the most marginalized groups, such as women, the disabled, 
and migrants (United Nations General Assembly, 2013b). The agenda will be launched 
in the United Nations 70th Summit in Autumn 2015, and the UN member states will be 
advised to adopt its outcomes as a new guiding set of principles. The Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland has articulated that Finland is strongly committed to the 
agenda setting process and aims to involve everyone in the process (Formin, 2013b). 
 
International migration is increasing, the number is expected to reach an estimated 405 
million migrants in 2050 (SRSG, 2013, p. 124). Migration in the form of diaspora 
investments, remittances, knowledge and skills transfers can enhance individual, local 
and national development. (SRSG, 2013, p. 124) Globally diaspora advocates have been 
pushing a joint diaspora agenda to the post-2015 platform. Diaspora associations are 
enormously heterogeneous and a joint agenda has been difficult to form. The main 
message promoted further is the demand to globally recognize diaspora as an active 
actor: one that holds expertize, that can be utilized in development. Diaspora advocacy 
has been largely unstudied sphere, until recently little research has been done on the 
topic (Newland, 2010). This research reflects the ‘diasporic-identity’ in diaspora 
advocacy work in the post-2015 agenda setting process. It explores how the African 
diaspora settled in Finland experienced the nature of the consultations and how the 
establishing actors perceived the role of the diaspora communities. Was diaspora seen 
as active or passive actors in the agenda setting?  
 
In 2014 Sweden was chairing a Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) 
event that tackled also the role of diaspora in post-2015 agenda setting. Sweden stated 
that they had been actively reaching out to their diaspora organizations to ensure that 
migrants themselves had a voice and were empowered to act (GFMD, 2014). Finland, 
commonly known for its active civil society and transparent governance, has also been 
promoting the role of diasporas in development. Whether this has simply been rhetoric, 
or if Finland has succeeded in empowering the diaspora association, is best assessed by 
giving voice to some of the African diaspora representatives themselves. The findings 
of this research do not claim to represent the entire diaspora society in Finland, but 
rather they give new insights concerning a less studied sphere of “diaspora advocacy” in 
Finland. 
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1.1 Research question 
Engaging diaspora communities in development cooperation and peace-building 
projects has been endorsed last years by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
(Formin, 2013a) (Formin, 2014a) (Formin, 2014b) (Formin, 2014c). The case of active 
Somali diaspora has been underlined to represent a well-formed cooperation between 
the Finnish officials and the diaspora communities (Formin, 2014d). However, is the 
voice of the diaspora members heard in practice? Are they considered as relevant 
stakeholders in policy processes like the global sustainable development agenda setting?  
 
This research aims to provide a contextual understanding of the post-2015 agenda 
setting process that took place in Finland during autumn 2013 and spring 2014.   The 
research explores how, during that time, the African diaspora communities were 
represented in the Finnish post-2015 agenda setting by emphasizing their self-
articulated reflections towards the process.  The research question is two-folded, the 
first question of my research emphasizes the experiences of the diaspora actors 
themselves, and the second directly addresses this diasporic identity an its role in the 
agenda setting. Within the research, a continuously fluctuating interpretations of whom 
is it that belongs to diaspora emerged. This notion of varying identity formation 
encouraged me to concentrate furthermore on the definition of the term diaspora. The 
questions are following: 
 
1. What were the African diaspora representatives perceived roles, self-
declared motivations for participation, and experienced limitations for 
participation, and how did they push their agendas in the post-2015 agenda 
setting? 
 
2. How did an understanding of ‘diasporic’-identity influence the deliberative 
nature of the post-2015 agenda setting in Finland?  
 
The findings of this research provide new insights concerning diaspora advocacy within 
Finland. Furthermore, results will display valuable feedback for the ongoing post-2015 
discussion, as well as further participatory processes that aim to overcome exclusion 
and cultural differences. However, this research does not intend to address, whether the 
global post-2015 deliberation process has been successful, or if global deliberation is 
even possible.  
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The structure of the research is as follows, the first chapter introduces the research 
questions and highlights the relevance of the study, the second chapter introduces the 
theoretical framework and key concepts and the third chapter contextualizes the country 
case. The research is located on the qualitative research field and the data was collected 
through elite-interviews and analyzed using qualitative content analysis. The fourth 
chapter further explains the use of these methods and data. The fifth chapter represents 
the findings of this study and is divided into two parts, the first tackles the self-declared 
motivations and captures the discursive profiles of the focus group, and the second part 
of the analysis considers the ‘diaspora-discourse’. Finally, the last chapter assesses the 
validity of the research. It provides final remarks and suggest policy implementations 
for further deliberative processes aiming to harness the voices of the African diaspora 
groups.  
1.2 Playfield for development cooperation actors  
To understand the public demand for a deliberative post-2015 agenda setting it is 
necessary to reflect the background conditions for the post-2015 process. Post-2015 
process aims to create the next set of global development goals and also include in the 
decision making process also the most marginalized groups, such as immigrants. In this 
chapter I will briefly explain how the drafting of these new global development goals 
has been largely influenced by the flaws of creating their predecessors, the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). This chapter explains how the exclusive nature of the 
MDG creation process forced the international community to seek for a more 
deliberative and inclusive approach for the current post-2015 agenda setting.  
 
Exclusive nature of the Millennium Development Goals 
The post-2015 process aims to create new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that 
will continue from where the MDGs ended. In the 1990s, before the MDGs existed, 
development field had been addressed as a “playfield” for many different actors 
promoting their particular ideas (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2009, p. 39). MDGs were 
preceded by International Development Goals (IDGs1), which resonated strongly in the 
MDGs.  
                                                 
1Development Assistance Committee (DAC) produced six International Development Goals (IDGs) in 
1996, which were approved by all OECD (Organization of Economic-cooperation and Development) 
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In the momentum of last Millennium at United Nations Millennium Summit, MDGs 
were endorsed. The MDG creation process at the time was largely criticized by civil 
society actors as being exclusive and not including civil society groups or the global 
South to the discussions (Amin, 2006) (Hulme, 2009, p. 32) (World Council of 
Churches, 2000). A previous head of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), Mark Malloch-Brown, later explained how he and a small group of experts 
created the eight MDGs in the basement of the UN office in New York in “relative 
casualness” (Tran, 2012). Despite the reaction of the civil society during Millennium 
Summit, all UN member states agreed to achieve these goals by the year 2015. States, 
NGOs, and financial institutions’ development policies were reformed according to 
MDG  priorities.  UN  aid  was  focused  to  fill  the  MDGs  and  large  campaigns  such  as  
Millennium Campaign were created to promote the goals globally (Hulme, 2009). 
 
The MDGs have helped to coordinate development objectives amongst wide spectrum 
of actors. They are seen as useful advocacy tools, and in addition they maintain political 
will for foreign and developmental policy (Wisor, 2012). The eight MDG’s cover a 
range of issues; eradicating hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting 
gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, beating HIV, 
AIDS, malaria and other diseases and ensuring environmental sustainability in 
developing a global partnership for development. The goals include number of 
quantitative development targets, as well as a number of indicators to measure them 
(UNDP, 2014). 
 
The indicators created to measure MDG targets have been largely criticized, as being 
based on a weak and unrealistic data (Summer & Kenny, 2011, p. 24). The framework 
did not specify who were the political actors responsible of the progress, nor did not 
include any accountability methods. According to Wisor (2012, p. 10) many of the 
“substantive flaws” of the MDGs can, to some extent, be explained by procedural 
weaknesses, including the lack of deliberative process and diverse participants in the 
process. Wisor lists that, for example, the absence of gender in many of the 
development goals may be partially explained through the absence of civil society and 
women groups in the target setting. The lack of sensitivity towards country contexts can 
                                                                                                                                               
members. IDGs just like MDGs had clear timeframes for achievement but they appeared to have little 
impact, as they were invented by donors and resonated little in the South (Fukuda-Parr, 2012). 
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be explained partially as a result due to the exclusion of people from the developing 
countries. According to Wisor; “the MDGs were created in an exclusive manner, 
allowing only a few key civil servants and development experts to be involved in the 
process” (2012, p. 12). There was also an absence of migration themes in the MDG 
agenda. The Secretary-General acknowledged that migration has been instrumental in 
achieving MDGs and recommended that migration should be integrated in the post-
2015 agenda (United Nations General Assembly, 2013a).  
 
Post-2015 agenda  
In 2010 the UN General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to make 
recommendations in order to advance the UN development agenda beyond 2015. The 
Secretary-General highlighted the need for an open and inclusive process when creating 
the post-2015 agenda that would also include the most marginalized: 
“There is consensus regarding the need for an open and inclusive 
consultation process, led by Member States and engaging all stakeholders, 
as well as the need to support the capacity of least developed countries and 
poor or marginalized people to participate in it.” (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2012)  
The post-2015 process is seen as a member state led process with a broad participation 
from external stakeholders including academics, scientists, businesses and civil society 
organizations. In order to accomplish this task a wide range of groups has been 
established, including the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons, the UN System Task 
Team on Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, the Open Working group on Sustainable 
Development Goals, and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDKP, 
2014).  
 
The post-2015 consultations included national consultations in over fifty developing 
countries that were to be complemented by regional and thematic meetings, as well as 
social media and other forms of outreach. The main focus of the consultations was to 
reach out to poor and marginalized people. The first phase of the consultations started 
2011 and lasted until fall 2014. The Second phase runs from fall 2014 through the year 
2015 and aims to achieve intergovernmental consensus. The first phase consisted of 
global thematic consultations that the UN Task Team promoted on topics covered in the 
MDGs: education; inequalities; health; governance; conflict and fragility; growth and 
 7
employment; environmental sustainability; hunger, nutrition and food security; 
population dynamics; energy; and water. Each thematic consultation was led by two or 
more UN agencies and Member States. The Task Team promoted the use of interactive 
web portals such as My World Survey, crowd-sourcing of views, submission of video 
testimonies, meeting summaries and artwork in order to raise awareness and gain 
support from citizens and stakeholders with the post-2015 agenda (UN System Task 
Team, 2012). 
 
Allthough this Master’s Thesis is the first study to address the post-2015 process in 
Finland globally a number of studies are targeting the post-2015 agenda setting. 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is coordinating a ‘Participate - research 
program’, which aims to harness the voices of the most marginalized groups into the 
post-2015 agenda setting. International Development School (IDS) is producing 
numerous papers on the post-2015 agenda process. Most of the academic papers target 
specific thematic areas that the authors wish to see at the agenda such as health, gender 
and inequality in the post-2015 agenda. A research group led by Jyrki Luukkanen from 
University of Tampere recently published their research on domestic debates in Kenya 
and Tanzania: “Kenya and Tanzania Beyond 2015: Exploring domestic debates and 
envisioning development futures (BEYOND 2015)”.  
2 Theoretical framework  
The theoretical framework for this study provides understanding for the deliberative 
nature of the post-2015 consultations. The first part of the theoretical framework offers 
definitions for essential concepts of the study: ‘diaspora’ and ‘discourse’. The second 
part of the theoretical framework introduces the theory of deliberative democracy, 
which starts by positioning the deliberative democracy theory within a broader context 
of deliberative studies, and explains the different interpretations and variety of nuances 
that have been under discussions during the last decade. Some problems that the 
deliberation has been accused to harbor, will be introduced and their relevance for this 
study will be assessed. This study will focus on one of the new ideas around 
deliberative democracy; the discursive representation, which further highlights the 
discursive profiles of citizens participating in deliberation.  
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2.1 Key Concepts 
Diaspora 
This research refers to diaspora as “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing 
and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with 
their countries of origin” (Sheffer, 1986, p. 3). The term diaspora has lately become a 
"buzz word" in academic field as well as in policy field (Pirkkalainen, 2013, p. 10). 
David Chariandy (2006) recognizes that academics are struggling to produce sufficient 
terms for this socio-cultural dislocation.  
 
The term diaspora originates from a Greek word 'diaispeirein' that means to scatter 
around. It has often been linked with the Jewish exile and thus carries a pervasive 
stigma. The term in an African context has originally been used to describe the slave 
trade across the Atlantic and Indian Ocean. Due to the historical connections, there is a 
great danger to victimize the diaspora communities. The victim status is not always 
applicable: diaspora backgrounds are very diverse and categories such as labor diaspora, 
imperial diaspora and trade diaspora are also being utilized in its description (Cohen, 
2008, p. 18). 
 
Irrespective, victim status is yet relevant in multiple cases, 2013 was one of the worst 
periods for forced displacement in decades. In 2013 multiple crises took place around 
the world; the crises in the Syrian Arab Republic, Central African Republic, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Mali caused 1,5 million individuals to seek refuge (UNHCR 
trends 2013). Often those diaspora members, who have experienced existential threats, 
are seen most active in diaspora advocacy work (Newland, 2010, s. 5). 
 
The political debate against migration is thriving in western countries. When 
considering Western governments’ migration policies, they are mainly focused on the 
number of refugees they will accept to enter to their territory. Migration policy should 
be coherently mainstreamed into other policy sectors. According to Vertovec diasporas 
have become significant players in the international politics, influencing specific policy 
spheres such as foreign affairs, economic development and international migration to 
take diasporas into account (Vertovec, 2005, s. 1).  
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A discursive role of migration and development has been criticized by Skeldon (2008). 
He argues that by always separating migration and development with the use of "and" 
makes us oblivious to migration as an integral component of development. According to 
Cohen (2008, p. 168) academics studying diaspora have always been aware that 
diasporic connections will lead to changes in the countries of origin. In addition 
development agencies, NGOs, and donor country governments have recently recognized 
these positive effects of diasporas. Cohen describes this recognition of the role of 
diasporas in the development field as a current "fashion". This has led to a new field of 
study for academia "How is migration and development linked through diasporas?" 
(2008, p. 169). Diaspora studies have explosively grown during the last decade, in the 
1970’s the word “diaspora” appeared only once or twice a year in dissertation abstracts . 
In contrast Tölölyan (2012, pp. 4, 12) displays that the term is becoming more and more 
popularized and is in danger of being used too carelessly. He emphasizes that diaspora 
studies need to acknowledge the complexity of the diasporas, and the combination of 
localism and transnationalism that diasporas inhabit. 
 
According to de Haas (2005) the most frequently used argument against migration as a 
potential source of development is that it stimulates brain drain. Brain drain anticipates 
that a country of origin loses highly skilled people as they migrate elsewhere. On the 
contrary, brain gain (the departure of the highly-skilled) may be beneficial for the 
country of origins in many ways, including remittances, investments, trade relations, 
new knowledge, innovations, new attitudes and information advances. (2005, p. 1272) 
De Haas encourages governments to create environments that foster migrants to remain 
involved in their home countries rather than maintaining migration policies that 
consider only how to stop migration flows (2005, p. 1282). When viewing diaspora as 
an active actor on the development field, the role of diaspora in financing development 
has been gaining most attention. Remittances from migrant workers provide a key 
source of finance for developing countries. In 2013, officially recorded remittances 
amounted to 410 billion US Dollars: more than three times the size of the official 
development assistance (The World Bank, 2013, p. 2). Migration also produces so 
called “social remittances”, including changes in perceptions and attitudes, which 
promotes diversity in our world (Global Migration Group, 2013, p. 3) (Philips D. A., 
2013) (Plaza & Ratha, 2011). 
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In 2002 the African Union (AU) decided to formally include Africans living in the 
Diaspora as the “Sixth Region” of AU’s organizational structure. According to Moyo 
(2007, p. 288), this decisions reaches out to Africans in the Washington, New York, 
London, Paris, Rome, Tokyo and elsewhere where global decision are made, and thus 
dramatically increases Africans possibilities to influence decision making. 
 
A recent study on the African diaspora associations based in Denmark reveals that the 
majority of Danish diaspora associations are currently involved in development 
activities. The engagement of these associations is in a large extent a result of the 
institutional frameworks and the opportunity structure in the receiving countries as well 
as in the Danish context. The experiences from Denmark show that reasons to include 
diaspora groups in development projects are for example migrant’s intimate knowledge 
about local conditions and their social networks to harness the local support for the 
projects. However some downsides were also considered, including occasions where 
migrants might reflect more on their own aspirations, rather than the needs of the local 
population. (Trans & Vammen, 2011, pp. 159-160) This diaspora politicization is 
leading the diaspora's elite to aspire towards becoming intermediaries between the 
governments of origin, and the countries of resettlement (Tölölyan, 2012, p. 12). 
 
DIASPEACE- research2 from 2010 examined the connections between those diasporas 
settled in Europe, who worked to ensure peace in their countries of origin. From 
interviews amongst the Somali diaspora, conducted by Päivi Pirkkalainen, the 
perceptions of diaspora engagement in peacebuilding were positive, but also critical. 
The benefits of diaspora engagement were perceived when providing school services 
and creating trust among those that could be promoted in Somalia. However, the 
fragmentation of the diaspora engagement was seen as a negative side. Some of the 
diaspora members supported the conflicting parties, whereas others supported peace- 
development-related activities  (Pirkkalainen, 2010, p. 49). 
A PhD dissertation from Jyväskylä University by Miikka Pyykkönen, “Organizing 
Diasporas, Ethnicity, Citizenship, Integration, and Government in Immigrant 
Associations” (2007), examined the work of immigration associations in Jyväskylä and 
                                                 
2 Diasporas for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potential of Long-distance Diaspora Involvement in Conflict  
Settings. Case Studies from the Horn of Africa. (DIASPEACE) was a three-year research project looking 
how diaspora groups can foster peace and development in their countries of origin. 
 11
Tampere. The results suggest that immigrant associations simultaneously empower and 
make immigrants governable. A Master’s Thesis from the University of Jyväskylä by 
Matleensa Seppälä (2013) “Maahanmuuttajajärjestöt Yhteiskunnallisina Vaikuttajina. 
Järjestöjen Kokemukset Vaikutusmahdollisuuksistaan” examined how migrant umbrella 
organizations experienced their possibilities to influence the society. The results 
emphasize the importance of the internal coherency and cross-cutting ethnical 
networking. A Bachelor’s Thesis from Turku University of applied sciences written by 
Jonna Heikkilä (2013) “Diaspora, Development Cooperation and Integration - 
Immigrants Reflections on Participation in the Development of Country of Origin.” 
examined whether Iraq and Somali immigrants would want to be involved in the 
development of their country of origin the results implicated that the interviewees had 
maintained their social transnational network in their country of origin and expressed a 
desire to be included in the development of their country of origin. 
 
The role of diaspora in Finnish society, especially the role of Somali diaspora in 
Finland, has been actively research during recent years. A PhD by Päivi Pirkkalainen 
“Transnational Responsibilities and Multi-sited Strategies: Voluntary Associations of 
Somali Diaspora in Finland”, from the University of Jyväskylä (2013), examined the 
participation and organizing processes of the Somali diaspora in Finland. The findings 
note that Somalis in Finland are strategically using voluntary associations in order to 
respond to the responsibilities relating to the country of the origin.   
 
Discourse 
Discourse refers to an understanding that language matters. Through the use of language 
we construct, interpret, and discuss matters (Dryzek J. , 1997, p. 8). Discourse can be 
seen “as a set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents with 
framework for making sense of situations and embodying judgments” (2006, p. 1).  
Discourses, according to Dryzek (2000, p. 121), are social as well as personal, and they 
do affect to the behavior of individuals and institutions that advocate them. Discourses 
rest on assumptions and judgments, and thus can be debated and deliberated over. 
Discourses can function in coordinating and achieving governance. One of the relevant 
discourses surrounding the post-2015 process is the ‘sustainable development’: this 
discourse that, according to Dryzek, is a discourse for international civil society. It is 
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constantly contested and recreated (2000, p. 123). The current post-2015 debate aims to 
harness the ‘sustainable development’ discourse in a shared set of goals and priorities.  
2.2 Theory of deliberative democracy 
This chapter provides an understanding of the complexity of deliberative studies. The 
first part of this chapter further explains the different interpretations and variety of 
nuances that have surrounded the deliberation discussions during the last decade. A 
guiding theory for this research, a theory of deliberative democracy, is also introduced. 
The second part examines problems surrounding the field and the last part introduces a 
“discursive profile” that focuses more on the self-reflected meaning makings of 
individuals, rather than the institutional structures of the process. This is valuable, as 
much research has been done on why people should deliberate, but little research has 
been done to seek why people themselves participate (Curato & Niemeyer, 2013). 
 
Deliberative theory has been described as one of the most influential developments 
within contemporary democratic theory (Smith, 2009, p. 11). Deliberation can be 
approached in multiple ways. This research originates from Anglo-American and 
European philosophical traditions of deliberative conceptions, which are based on 
classical studies of Habermas (1984) and Rawls (1997). Deliberation amongst these 
traditions seeks to legitimize political decisions by assessing whether they have been an 
outcome of free, equal, and rational agents (Cini, 2011, p. 6). 
 
Classical and radical wing  
One way of approaching theories among these roots is to divide them into classical and 
radical elements. The radical wing (Sanders, 1997) (Young , 2000) (Dryzek J. S., 2000) 
challenges classical ideas (Habermas , 1984) (Elster, 1998) (Rawls, 1997) regarding 
state-led top-down deliberation, where more weight is put on the quality of the 
arguments and on the institutionalization of the process,  rather than the social inclusion 
and bottom-up participation. (Cini, 2011, p. 7) To sum up the understanding of 
deliberation, I use Cini’s interpretation that carries through this research;   
“Deliberation is a process of public reasoning by means of which initial 
(and self-interested) preferences of participants are transformed to include 
all the different views and finally to lead to the common good. This public 
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discussion, capable of modifying opinions and interests taken for granted, 
forms the core of deliberative democracy” (Cini, 2011, p. 10). 
Deliberative characteristics 
For a process to be deliberative it should function in a public sphere and be accessible to 
everyone (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2005). The process can continue even after the 
decisions has been agreed: most of the cases result in questioning the justification of the 
decision (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). For Miller (2006), a democratic system is 
deliberative when decisions are achieved through an open process of discussion, where 
participants are free to contribute and equally willing to listen and consider all the 
opposing views. 
 
The instrumental value from deliberation arises as it is considered as a valuable political 
process in enabling citizens to make the most justifiable political decisions (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004, p. 21). A non-instrumental value for deliberation can be seen when 
during deliberation a sense of community and group solidarity is generated (Curato & 
Niemeyer, 2013, p. 370). The focus within a deliberative approach is to include multiple 
views in the discussions, yet often the most marginalized are not engaged. 
 
Inclusion of marginal voices 
Deliberation should be committed to "maximization of free, equal and authentic access" 
of individuals, interests, and groups that have been traditionally excluded from decision-
making. (Dryzek J. S., 2000, p. 86) Marginalized stakeholders are critical for the 
accountability of the decisions, while offering new information and ideas (Lee, 2013, p. 
410). Miller (2006, p. 203) argues that deliberative theory is biased against groups that 
have been historically disadvantages such as "the poor, ethnic minorities, women". He 
further argues that deliberation works in advantage for white middle-class males. Smith 
(2009, p. 163) suggests that if modes for engagement have not been carefully designed, 
there is a real danger that the needs and right of politically marginalized groups will be 
further disregarded.  
 
Alice Siu and Dragan Stanisevski (2012) have pondered these questions in their recent 
work, "Addressing Inequality, Exclusion and Marginalization", and propose some 
techniques to be applied when reaching out for marginalized groups. These include 
mandatory inclusion by facilitated with techniques such as quotas, proportional 
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representation and reserved seats. They show that the most commonly used method in 
activating marginalized groups, is the network-based recruitment, where organizers map 
the different networks found in community and reach out to the leaders within those 
networks. They also propose a shift from traditional ways of communication to more 
diverse modes of communication, in order to include participants from variety of 
backgrounds (2012, pp. 90-95). 
 
A participatory governance is based on a vision where marginalized stakeholders can, 
through participatory governance methods, meaningfully participate in the process. If 
marginalized stakeholders have not been able to influence to the outcome, the 
participatory process becomes only a 'cosmetic' one (Lee, 2013, p. 405). The 
participation approach brings those who are affected by a problem to solve the problem. 
The model is claimed to be useful especially when solving complex problems like 
poverty and economic development (2013, p. 412). 
2.2.1 Problems with deliberation  
In real-world politics, it is often the powerful and elite that dominates the decision 
making. Deliberative procedures are criticized to exclude multiple actors, including the 
most marginalized. Deliberative meetings are often organized according to a set of rules 
that have been established by those who maintain the power. Formal inclusion (a 
cosmetic participation) of the less-privileged is not enough if it leaves them without 
their own voice at the discussions (Young, 2003, ss. 108-111). John Gastil (2008, pp. 4-
10) criticizes the inclusive participation system, where everyone has been given the 
opportunity to speak but no tools to understand the matters under discussions. He 
discusses "enlightened understanding", which refers to a system of participation where 
the public becomes well informed enough to speak, act and vote. He argues that 
everyone should be given tools to understand the issues they find important, and 
chances to explain their views on those issues.  
 
Critics of deliberation have claimed that those who participate in deliberative forums are 
often the same educated, articulated, and economically advantaged individuals who also 
have an easy access for traditional sites of political power (Sanders, 1997) (Young , 
2000) (Curato & Niemeyer, 2013). Deliberation can easily transform into group 
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polarization or enclave deliberation. Group polarization occurs when some of the 
members have not been provided sufficient information, and rather are expected to 
follow the pre-determined decisions of the more powerful (Sunstein, 2003) (Sunstein, 
2000). Enclave deliberation involves deliberation among like-minded people. Enclave 
deliberation does give space to views of ‘low status’ members (sometimes women) but 
the members of ‘low status’ groups are often silenced within heterogeneous bodies. 
High-status members are more active in deliberation and their ideas often have more 
influence (Fishkin & Laslett, 2003). Decision makers tend to use these processes in 
order to establish public perceptions of legitimacy for their actions (Peterson, 1996).  
 
Another issue comes with the difficulties of securing the representation of all groups. 
Jon Elster (1998) claims that it could be difficult, if not impossible, to secure the 
representation of all relevant interest groups. A stakeholder led deliberation that 
involves relevant stakeholders and civil society organizations has been seen as a process 
towards more open policy making process. However when defining who will be 
selected as a convenient stakeholder, and who is to be invited to the discussions, is  a 
matter of power struggle (Papadoupulos, 2012). Those represented by the stakeholders 
and advocacy groups might not be informed of the existence of such representatives 
speaking on their behalf (Papadoupulos, 2012, p. 144). Jane Mansbridge (2003, p. 194) 
on the other hand suggests that not everyone attending deliberation forums wishes to be 
seen as representatives of those who do not attend.  
 
Deliberation also has its own costs: wasted time and indecisions. The deliberation 
process may be lengthy and demand plenty of human recourses without ever reaching 
agreed conclusions; “How much is too much deliberation?” ask Fishkin and Laslet 
(2003). The timing of public hearings also matter: deliberation is only cosmetic if 
hearings have been scheduled so late in the process that the preliminary or final 
decisions have already been reached. This does not enable the citizens to participate but 
rather leada them to feel ignored (Gastil, 2008, p. 189). 
 
A common objection against deliberative democracy claims that citizens themselves are 
unwilling to participate in democratic politics and, in particular deliberation. Political 
apathy is often described as a specific character for young adults and younger 
generations (Curato & Niemeyer, 2013, p. 356) (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002).  
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2.2.2 Discursive representation  
As the representation of relevant identities can be so numerous that it is difficult to 
include everyone in the decision making, a discursive deliberation approach aims to 
deliberate across discourses rather than engage across identities. Discursive 
representation, according to Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), is an integral aspect of 
deliberative democracy. Discursive representation is aligned with many of the aspects of 
deliberative democracy, but aims to further explore whether discourses rather than 
individuals are being represented. The number of discourses to be presented is often less 
than the number of individuals that are affected by the matters. Discourses can also 
contain political power-play by favoring some interests and repressing others (2008, p. 
482). Representation of marginal discourses is highly important to ensure democratic 
equality (2008, p. 488). Every individual and group may engage with multiple 
discourses, therefore discursive representation becomes adaptive and flexible, rather 
than a set of fixed roles (2008, p. 483). Whereas Young (2000) has proposed a veto-
power for those oppressed groups affected by a certain discourse, Dryzek and Niemeyer 
do not ratify this, rather they rather propose identifying a set of individuals in a certain 
discourse and then ask them to select a representative for the discourse. Regardless, the 
question of selecting the representative for the discourse needs to be thoroughly 
investigated. Identities and discourses are still closely linked: for Dryzek, it is 
discourses that create identities (2006, pp. 34,39). 
 
Discursive profile 
A study conducted in 2001 by Lowndes et. al, highlights how involving citizens for 
current discussions has been widely acknowledged during the past years. Looking into 
focus groups, their team revealed reasons for citizen’s participation: citizens participate 
on consultations that matter to them. Focus groups claimed that they would get involved 
also in “big issues”, but only few had actually done so. The authors listed reasons why 
people do not participate, suggesting themes such as lack of awareness, lack of council 
response, and issues of social exclusion: “There was a strong sense among many 
involved in the focus groups that participation was for ‘other people’. For some, there 
was a general sense that getting involved simply ‘suited’ particular people.” (Lowndes, 
Pratchett, & Stoker, 2001, p. 453). 
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In their article “Reaching Out to Overcome Political Apathy: Building Participatory 
Capacity through Deliberative Engagement”, Nicole Curato and Simon Niemeyers 
(2013) introduced the notion of a discursive profile. They challenge the deliberative 
theory critics complaints towards citizens’ lack of willingness to participate. Their 
article is motivated by findings of Jacobs, Cook and Delli Carpini (2004), who indicated 
that while biases based on socioeconomic status exist, deliberative participation by 
marginalized groups is nevertheless significant. Similarly Neblo et. al, (2010) argue that 
the people attracted in deliberative sessions are precisely those turned off by standard 
partisan and interest group politics.   
 
Discursive profiles answer the question “what is it that motivates citizens to 
deliberate?” (Curato & Niemeyer, 2013, p. 358). Discursive profile refers to; 1) 
participants’ own subjective beliefs, particularly regarding their perceived role in the 
democratic process and 2) their articulated motivations for joining a deliberative forum 
(2013, p. 357). The authors reason the importance for looking into the discursive profile 
under this precursor is a deeper insight when concerning the type of a citizen who 
willingly engages in deliberation. The authors do also recognize the other factors that 
contribute to the willingness, such as personality and opportunity-related (time and 
income), but place more attention to the self-declarations (2013, p. 358). The current 
debate around the issue of motivation has largely focused on the systemic or structural 
questions dimensions of the question “why deliberate?”. Curato and Niemeyer note that 
the “first-personal version” of this question “why do I deliberate?” has not received as 
much attention (2013, p. 359). The authors claim that analysis focusing on the 
deliberators’ expressed reasons for participating is constructive as it lends insight into 
the participatory process of ‘meaning making’, and to the ways which deliberation is 
“articulated, negotiated and transformed” (2013, p. 359). 
 
Niemeyer and Curato encourage researchers to place attention to the discursive 
characterization in order to better understand what it is that motivates citizens to 
deliberate. I aim to use their conception of discursive profile and assess the self-declared 
motivations of my selected focus group for participating. I will also enlarge the use of 
discursive profile, but unlike Niemeyer and Curato, include participants who felt 
neglected by the deliberation process. Whereas in Curato and Niemeyer’s research the 
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participant’s were analyzed during the process, in this research participants are 
interviewed on events that have already taken place in recent history.  
 
The research questions for this study have been formed after carefully studying the 
theoretical framework introduced. The first question “What were the African diaspora 
representatives perceived roles, self-declared motivations and experienced limitations 
for participation and how did they push their agendas in the post-2015 agenda 
setting?” focuses on the discursive representation and follows Curato and Niemeyer’s 
(2013) work. The first question also addresses some of the problems deliberation has 
faced (Sanders, 1997) (Sunstein, 2003) (Young , 2000) (Papadoupulos, 2012) when 
assessing experienced limitations of the African diaspora in participation.  
 
The second question, “How did an understanding of ‘diasporic’-identity influence the 
the deliberative nature of the post-2015 agenda setting in Finland?” uses Dryzek’s and 
Niemeyers (2008) research on discursive representation. The discursive representation 
is reflected in the deliberative characteristics. These two questions, when linked to the 
theoretical framework and the context, provide new insights considering the role of the 
African diaspora in decision-making in Finland. The next chapter will focus on the 
Finnish context and the post-2015 agenda setting in Finland. 
3 Contextualizing the country-specific Case: Finland 
This chapter provides an understanding of the current discussions linking diaspora and 
development in Finland. It starts by linking Finland’s foreign policy to the United 
Nation’s (UN) global development policies and thus explains why the post-2015 agenda 
setting is seen as a matter of interest in Finland. The context briefly introduces how the 
diaspora actors have been able to participate in Finnish development cooperation. It 
illustrates how the diaspora discourse has recently been promoted by the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland. Towards the end of this chapter an overview of the post-
2015 agenda setting process is provided.  
 
The context provides sufficient background information that prepares the reader for the 
analysis chapter. This understanding helps to comprehend some of the choices made in 
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the analysis phase, such as the framing of the questions and the selection of the focus 
group for this study. 
3.1 Diaspora’s participation in Finnish development cooperation  
Finland in multilateral system 
An essential part of Finland’s foreign and security policy is development policy. 
Development policy covers all the coherent activities in Finland’s national and 
international policies that aim to strengthen international stability, security, justice, and 
sustainable development. In September 2000, Finland along 189 nations, adopted the 
UN Millennium Declaration at the United Millennium Summit. The Millennium 
Declaration and the eight Millennium Development Goals discussed earlier has since 
provided the framework for the implementation of Finland’s development policy 
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2004, p. 4). 
 
Since 2004 the eradication of extreme poverty has been the primary objective of 
Finland’s development policy. Finland’s latest Development Policy Programme from 
2012 set Finland’s development cooperation to pursue a human rights-based approach 
on development. The crosscutting objectives found in the programme are gender 
equality, inequality reducing and climate sustainability. The programme highlights that 
Finland will take an active role in the process of revision of the Millennium 
Development Goals beyond 2015 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 6). Finland’s 
development policy objectives are advocated through different modalities; regionally, 
multilaterally, and nationally (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 17). The 2012 
policy programme aimed to increase Finland’s focus on multilateral organizations. The 
UN is referred  in the programme as a cornerstone of the Finnish multilateral system. 
UN influence towards Finland’s development policies is evident: the post-2015 process 
being a UN Member State process, thus requires Finland’s participation in agenda 
setting. 
 
Diaspora’s participation in Finland 
According to Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, and a  
leader of DIASPEACE-research programme, professor Liisa Laakso, European and 
Finnish migration policy has been centered on domestic policies and integration. Not 
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much attention has been given on migration themes surrounding foreign affairs. Though 
diasporas can push unrealistic or politicized agendas, Laakso speaks strongly for the 
knowledge maintained by diasporas to be utilized (Laakso, Helsingin Sanomat, 2011). 
 
Diaspora is slowly being recognized in the Finnish development cooperation. Finland’s 
Development Policy Programme 2012 acknowledges that policy coherence is needed 
within areas such as migration, trade and development. The role of migrant remittances 
and the need to utilize the expertise and connections of immigrant organizations in 
development cooperation is addressed in the programme (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
2012). In 2012, The Ministry of the Interior launched the ‘Future of Migration 2020 –
strategy’, which aims to reach a coherent and active strategy for migration. It notes that 
migration policy is linked to foreign and development policy, and despite the fact that 
this is well known nationally it criticizes that this is “not adequately reflected in 
practice”. Migrant community aspirations to improve the conditions in their countries of 
origin are advised to be linked more closely with Finland’s development policy 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2013, p. 16). A recently published report ‘Finnish 
Development Policy in Fragile States’ highlights that those living in exile maintain 
connections to their home countries and have local knowledge, and information on local 
development needs (Formin, 2014a, p. 28). 
 
In 2012, Finland had 195 511 (3.6 %) immigrants (Family Federation, 2014). Most 
immigrants have arrived to Finland from neighboring countries; Estonia, Russia and 
Sweden. The fourth largest immigrant group by country of origin is Somalis3.  As  the  
number of immigrants in Finland is growing, so is the importance of including them 
indecisions making. Heated discussions around migration are taking place within the 
Finnish media and parliament. Some nationalists would like to close the Finnish 
borders. They claim that these migrants do not integrate well to Finnish society and are 
portrayed as troublemakers (Haavisto 2011). This debate needs more active immigrants 
and the inclusion of immigrants in decisions making as a way to encourage these groups 
to voice their own opinions.  
                                                 
3 From African countries the top ten largest communities in Finland 2013 came from Somalia (7590), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1640), Nigeria (1851) , Ghana (1163) , Ethiopia (994) , Kenya (968), 
Morocco (900) , South Sudan (666), Egypt (572) , Gambia (454). Source: Statistics Finland (Migri 2013) 
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Table 1: Foreign nationals in Finland top 10. Source: Statistics Finland (Migri, 2012) 
 
The Somali diaspora have been one of the most active diaspora in Finland. Pirkkalainen 
describes the historical connections between Finland and Somalia as related to 
development cooperation, starting in the early 1980’s when Finland was the fourth 
largest development aid funder in Somalia. Due to a civil war aid channels were closed, 
and Finland ended its bilateral development cooperation in 1991. Since 1991, 
development cooperation has been largely implemented by NGOs and the Somali 
diaspora has been seen as a central actor (Formin, 2014). The Somali community in 
Finland is often associated with marginalization and social problems, in which 
unemployment and “underemployment” constitute significant problems. Out of those 
speaking Somali as their mother tongue, 52 % were unemployed in 2012 (Pirkkalainen, 
2013, p. 56). Somalis have been the most active group of immigrants establishing 
voluntary associations. There are more than 100 registered Somali associations in 
Finland, in which approximately 40-50 are active. (Pirkkalainen, 2013). Finland’s 
support to Somalia in the years 2013-2016 will be approximately 35 million euros 
(Formin, 2013a). In his maiden speech as the Minister for International Development, 
Pekka Haavisto highlighted engaging the diaspora as one of his key focuses during his 
term (Njeri-Konttinen, 2014) (Koski, 2010) (Salminen, 2013). According to Haavisto 
"We have to remember that we have 15.000 well-educated Somalis in Finland, who 
know thoroughly know their country. They are asking what is their role and what can 
they do?4” (Salminen, 2013). 
                                                 
4 Translated by the researcher. 
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Due to the large number of Somalis in Finland, the Somali diaspora is the most 
researched diaspora: not much attention has been given to  other diasporas. This 
research aims to explore how the African diaspora is represented in Finland. The results 
will reveal how the Somali diaspora attempts to enable other diasporas in deliberation. 
The focus group includes representatives with Somali background, but also 
representatives from other parts of Africa. 
3.2 A stakeholder approach for setting Post-2015 agenda  
This chapter provides a contextual understanding of the post-2015 agenda setting that 
took place in Finland during Autumn 2013 and Spring 2014. I will first reflect the 
coordination process and then introduce the different working streams Finland has 
established. I will highlight the global advocacy opportunities Finland had gained either 
by having Finnish individuals positioned on a high-level platforms, or as a state co-
chairing one of the thematic areas. These high-level positions could have provided 
excellent thematic areas also to include diaspora representatives and thus advance the 
deliberation of the global agenda setting.  
 
The agenda setting in Finland followed a stakeholder approach. According to Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA), Finland is strongly committed to formulate the 
post-2015 development agenda. The agenda setting in Finland followed a model set up 
during Rio+20. The Finnish positions closely followed strongly the latest development 
policy programme of Finland. “A summary of main views of Finland for the post-2015 
agenda”, published in June 2014 amongst other issues promoted the rights and equal 
participation of most marginalized groups such as ethnic, religious and sexual 
minorities. The analysis chapter of this study will provide reflections from the African 
diaspora considering their positions on the agenda setting. 
 
For such a small country, Finland had established multiple high-level opportunities 
where the diaspora could have been utilized. Finnish official, Ambassador Pertti 
Majanen, was elected to co-chair the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Financing Committee. This position was seen as a unique opportunity to influence 
global development (Formin, 2013c). The strategy provided by the financing committee 
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has been described as playing a key role in the implementation of the post-2015 
Development Agenda (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2014).  
 
Another important position for Finland was to co-chair global thematic consultations on 
“Conflict, Violence and Disaster”.  Regional consultations were set in Indonesia, 
Liberia, and Panama, with a final Global Consultation arranged in Helsinki in March 
2013. The consultation series was stressed to significantly contribute on linking themes 
of peace and security to the post-2015 agenda (Formin, 2013d). 
 
In April 22, MFA launched a working group to establish Finnish views on post-2015. 
This working group included 22 permanent members, representing Finnish ministries, 
unions, business, civil society and academia. The working group has been processing 
the Finnish agenda for the negotiations between governments since Autumn 2014. 
(Formin, 2014f). Two civil society umbrella organizations are represented in the MFA 
national working group: Kepa and Kehys. 
 
The civil society voices, including the voices of the diaspora, were pushed to the agenda 
by The Finnish NGDO platform to the EU, Kehys and The Finnish NGO platform 
Kepa. The first phase of the civil society hearings were facilitated by Kehys. These 
included 14 national thematic and general discussions for NGOs and NGDOs, including 
a consultation on migration (Kehys, 2013a). The second phase for harnessing the civil 
society voices was the establishment of CSOs working group, the Finnish Post-2015 
task force. The task force was established in December 2013, when some member 
organizations of KEPA saw the need for closer cooperation with the post-2015 process. 
The task Force has an open email list where anyone is free to join: currently there are 
40-50 people on the email list and around 10 active member organizations. The working 
premise of the task force was to create a platform for discussion and information 
sharing, as well as link civil society to the post-2015 agenda setting in Finland for the 
drafting of policy-position papers. The role of diasporas in the task force will be 
addressed in the analysis chapter. 
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4 Methodology and Research Data  
This research utilized qualitative research methods. The data was collected through 
semi-structured elite-interviews and analyzed using qualitative content analysis. This 
study aimed to enable the respondents to reflect on participation experience. The 
selected methods are assessed to be most suitable with this kind of research framework.   
4.1 Interview as a method for qualitative research 
Semi-structured elite interviews 
Compared to more structured forms of interviews, semi-structured interviews place 
values and interpretations at the core of the method (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 1991). The 
method is based on an idea that interviews are conducted through certain selected 
themes, which the researcher manages. The method allows the researcher to repeat 
questions, to play with the order of the questions, and to clear some of the 
misunderstandings with the interviewees (Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2009, p. 73). The selected 
themes for this interview were constructed based on the theoretical framework of this 
study, and were grounded through previous research and debate. For more detail see the 
interview framework5.  
 
The semi-structured interview allows space for questions and dialogue to emerge. Semi-
structured interviews are often used in elite interviewing as it allows respondents to be 
the experts on the topic of the interview (Leech, 2002).  The interviews of this study are 
considered as elite interviews. The elite interview approach in social sciences has 
commonly been defined in two ways: the first approach, sees elites as a superior group 
in society because of its power, whereas the second approach sees elite as experts of 
people, who have special knowledge on special functions (Dexter, 1970) (Mykkänen , 
2001). In this research there appears two categories of elite; the first one is defined as 
diaspora experts, who have special knowledge gained by their own experiences from 
diaspora and the second one is the establishing stakeholders, who have been affiliated to 
coordinate the post-2015 agenda setting, and possess structural knowledge of the 
process. 
 
                                                 
5 Appendix 1: Interview framework 
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Interestingly, the diaspora elite can also be considered as representatives of 
marginalized minorities in Finland. This aspect of ‘marginalized elite’ added another 
dimension to the interviews: marginalization. At the beginning of the interviews the 
respondents were presented a challenged regarding their assumptions towards diaspora 
and marginalization. I preferred to give them a possibility to challenge this cultural 
assumption, but many of them viewed diaspora to be marginalized in this specific 
agenda setting context. Interviewing marginalized groups could be done via ‘critical 
perspective’, where the purpose of the study would be to discover societal problems. 
This would demand the researcher to oppose neutrality and rather aim towards action 
research, where the researcher should bring problems to light and help the minorities 
and the silenced (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 20-21). Rather than fully turning this 
research into action research, I have tried to prioritize neutrality. In the concluding 
chapter,  some policy implementations are introduced to further engage with the most 
marginalized diaspora members in decision making. 
 
Cultural dimensions were also taken into account during the interview phase. When the 
interviewee and the interviewer have lived under different cultural influences, one can 
assume that they have different interpretations of the surrounding realities. When 
preparing to a multicultural interview situations, the interviewer should have some prio-
knowledge of the culture of the respondent. Finding common shared experiences, such 
as common habitant, social status, or personal history can also build trust between the 
interviewer and interviewee (Rastas, 2005).  
4.2 Data  
The main source of analysis for this research was collected through interviews. Eight 
interviews were conducted. Out of these eight, five of them can be seen as focus group 
interviews, and three as establishing stakeholder interviews. As there is a large quantity 
of previous research focusing on the Somali diaspora, this research wishes to reflect the 
experiences of the other African diasporas in Finland. The focus group is defined to 
cover African diaspora actors that were considered to be active or interested in 
development cooperation. 
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Prior to the interviews I conducted desk studies about African diaspora representation in 
Finland to gain an understanding of whom to interview. In addition to desk study, 
snowball sampling was used to select the interviewees. Snowball sampling means that 
interviewees are selected according to a reference.  
 
Nine diaspora organizations were approached and five interviews with the African 
diasporas were conducted. Out of the five diaspora participants, four were male. The 
interviewees represented the following diaspora umbrella organizations; Finnish 
African Diaspora Platform for Development, Finnish Somalia Network, The African 
Civil Society of Finland, Nordic Working Group on Migration and Development and 
Finnish Liberian Friendship Association. 
 
Contacting the interviewees is mainly a motivational act to encourage and confirm them 
to participation (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 1991, p. 66). When contacting the interviewees for 
this study the responses were mainly positive, but occasionally there was a need to send 
several reminders before an answer was receive. Some of the smaller diaspora 
associations did not confirm the interview times and therefore the interviews were left 
out of this study. The interviews were conducted during Summer 2014. As summertime 
is often the busiest holiday season in Finland, some of the interviews were arranged 
with very short notice.  
 
To gain information on the background conditions and strategies for the post-2015 
process, and to reflect the experiences that the establishing organizations had towards 
diaspora participation also, some of the establishing actors were interviewed. This  
consisted of interviews with representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland, The Finnish NGO Platform for Development (KEPA), and The Finnish NGDO 
Platform to the EU (KEHYS).  
 
As this research does not aim to create generalized statistics, but rather aims to describe 
the perceptions of a selected focus group, I am pleased with the selection of the focus 
group. The group consisted of people with knowledge and understanding, as well as 
abilities to critically discuss about the topic.  
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All of the diaspora members interviewed had either secondary or tertiary educational 
background. They had all lived in Finland five or more years and currently lived in the 
capital of Finland, Helsinki. All of them were working full-time and were actively 
involved in immigration associations. All of the interviewees considered themselves as 
diaspora representatives. They all had connections to their countries of origins: most of 
them had some relatives or entire families living there. Most of the interviewees seemed 
to characterize themselves as advantageous when considering their possibilities to 
influence the post-2015 agenda setting. 
 
All the interviews were conducted by the researcher and recorded. Transcribed, the 
interviews consisted of 87 A4 pages (Times New Roman) of text. A question of 
anonymity aroused during the research -the timing and context of the research took 
place when the post-2015 agenda was still in the making, and as Philips (1998) notes, 
when the policy-making process is ongoing the notion of anonymity needs to be taken 
account. To guard the respondents’ anonymity, I decided not to use the interviewees' 
real names but rather code their responses as D1, D2, D3, D4, D56 and Kehys, Kepa, 
MFA.  I audio recorded the interviews in order to minimize information loss. 
 
Some problems in interview situations and in the analysis phase might be caused by 
different social classes colliding. The different communication styles and the language 
skills of respondents might vary. Misunderstandings might be caused when the 
interviewer and the responder use wording that enables different interpretations, or 
when there is not a common vocabulary. The so-called “language game” means that 
both parties are using language partly intentionally and partly unintentionally to play 
with words and sayings (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 1991, pp. 48-48). As experienced during 
these interviews, one of the difficulties turned out to be the language. None of the 
African diaspora representatives interviewed used their native language in the interview 
situation. Most of the respondents were struggling to find some wording and definitions. 
Some of the interviewees wished to be interviewed in Finnish and some in English. 
 
In the analysis chapter a lot of citations are being used. As the aim is to reflect the 
interviewees’ motivations and experiences, this study will use their wording and give 
                                                 
6 D refers to diaspora representative  
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the interviewees their own voice in this research. Some of the questions to ponder when 
using the citations were how to decide which citations to include and which ones to 
exclude. 
4.3 Qualitative Content Analysis 
Qualitative content analysis (QCA) is a method to analyze qualitative material by 
classifying the material into a coding frame. In the QCA process the meanings are being 
constructed by the researcher, and the method is described to be most suitable when 
some degree of interpretation is required. What distinguishes QCA from other methods 
is its focus on specific and selected aspects of the data, known as the coding frame. It 
reduces the amount of data analyses, by limiting the search only to the data that is 
relevant to the research question (Schreier, 2012, pp. 4,7). It is a theory directed analysis 
where the framework for analysis is built on the previous theoretical knowledge but also 
to the empirics was actively followed.  
 
QCA steps followed included; 1) deciding on the research question, 2) selecting the 
material, 3) building of the coding frame, 4) dividing the material into units of coding, 
5) trying out the coding frame, 6) evaluating and modifying the coding frame, 7) main 
analysis and finally, 8) interpreting and presenting the findings (Schreier, 2012, p. 6). 
These steps involved careful reading and studying of the data, mapping of relevant and 
interesting themes and topics that repeatedly appeared in the transcribed texts.    
 
For coding purposes I used the Atlas.ti programme. I was very pleased with the visual 
networks that allowed me to analyze and work with my data, the visualization of the 
interconnections, as well as the differences and common patterns in the texts. 
Characteristics that differed a lot were identified and according to them typologies were 
constructed. 
 
QCA aims to study how different meanings have been produced, whereas discourse 
analysis emphasizes the role of language in the construction of social reality and studies 
the practices of producing knowledge, the (Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2009, p. 104). Some 
premises from discourse methodology have been used to complement the analysis of 
“diaspora discourse”, but rather than focusing on different nuances or pauses or tones of 
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voice, the focus has been to introduce different interpretations of understanding in order 
to make visible the perspectives of which meanings were produced.  
 
Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2009, pp. 134-137) question whether qualitative analysis has any 
shared agreements on how to measure the dependability of one’s research. The 
reliability for QCA process comes from its consistency (Schreier, 2012). The 
consistency of this study has been checked by exploding the coding format to a few 
outsiders to hear their comments and reflections. I have aimed to be as objective as 
possible, but I acknowledged that as a researcher one's subjectivity cannot be denied but 
must continuously be challenged.  
5 Can you hear the diaspora?  
The post-2015 agenda setting has ambitious goals; it aims to harness the voices of the 
most marginalized into the decision making. This research explores how the African 
diaspora in Finland experienced the post-2015 consultations. A current debate in 
Finland against migration often labels immigrants as passive and unwilling to 
participate in politics. This research challenges these assumptions and tries to look 
deeper to what is it that motivates African diaspora into participation and what 
hindering factors there is for their participation. As introduced in the context chapter, 
the post-2015 process in Finland closely followed a stakeholder approach. Stakeholders 
perceived as relevant by the coordinating and establishing actors were invited to the 
agenda setting. At the hearings, stakeholders advanced issues relevant to their own 
advocacy interests. This analysis seeks whether African diaspora was seen as a relevant 
stakeholder, and if so, what ways of advocacy it used. 
 
The analysis is divided into two different parts. The first parts answers the first research 
question: “What were the African diaspora representatives perceived roles, self-
declared motivations and experienced limitations for participation and how did they 
push their agendas in the post-2015 agenda setting?” The first chapter provides a so-
called discursive profile that seeks to address the African diaspora’s own subjective 
beliefs in regarding their perceived role in the post-2015 agenda setting process. 
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The second part of the analysis answers to the second research questions: “How did an 
understanding of ‘diasporic’-identity influence the deliberative nature of the post-2015 
agenda setting in Finland?". The second question emerges during the research and 
assesses both the African diasporas as well as the establishing stakeholders 
understanding of a specific discourse of “diasporic-identity”.  
5.1 Discursive profiles 
There is yet fairly little research done on what motivates citizens to deliberate. 
According to Curato and Niemeyer (2013) a discursive characterization guides us to 
better understand what motivates citizens to deliberate. The authors claim that against a 
common understanding, even the most marginalized citizens can be attracted to 
deliberate. This chapter seeks to recognize the different subjective roles and motivations 
of the African diaspora interviewed. The discursive profiles consist of characterization 
of their self-reflect positions, hindering factors and ways to push their agendas to the 
post-2015 agenda setting. 
 
The discursive profiles presented here do not aim to make generalizations in order to 
cover the entire African diaspora population. Rather, they aim to further understanding 
on how different African diaspora members viewed the post-2015 process. The African 
diaspora interviewed for this study can be considered as elite, even through they are 
marginalized at the agenda setting. All the interviewees had possibilities to access the 
post-2015 agenda setting at some level7: this is not the case with most of the African 
diaspora in Finland. The elite interviewees highlighted that most of the African diaspora 
communities had “no clue” about the process. The findings of this research do not claim 
to represent entire diaspora society in Finland: rather they give new insights considering 
a less studied sphere of “diaspora advocacy” in Finland. 
5.1.1 The footholders, spokespersons and patronized 
The African diaspora representatives interviewed can be characterized under three 
different categories. These categories will provide understanding of what type of 
diaspora representative is likely to participate in the decision making. The 
                                                 
7 See more shared characterizations of the focus group at the Data chapter. 
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characterization also draws attention to the multiple ways of experiencing the nature of 
the consultations. The categories created to explain the self-reflected roles of the 
diaspora members in the post-2015 agenda setting are; 1) footholders 2) spokesperson 
and, 3) patronized. The categorization aims to describe the major differences between 
the focus group. The categories are not strictly bound, and occasionally there was some 
overlapping within them.  
 
‘Footholders’ refers to diaspora representatives that have gained a foothold position 
within Finnish institutional structures, it could refer to people holding an office in the 
ministry level, people being nominated in committee boards of stakeholder groups, or 
other significant institutions that had a role to play in the post-2015 agenda setting.  
“mä oon itse [xx] toimikunnanjäsen, niin kyllä se on jotenkin etuoikeutettua, 
koska siinä pystyy nostamaan tätä konkreettista käytännön tasoa -- kyllä 
mut hyvin otettu vastaan, että ainakaan mulla ei ole semmosta kokemusta, 
etten uskalla olla mukana ja kun uskaltaa vaatia olla mukana niin kyllä se 
viestii menee eteenpäin”  (Interview D1, 2014) 
”no kyllä se on myös työn kautta ja sitten järjestöjen kautta ja sitten myös 
ulkoministeriön kun me ollaan ulkoministeriön kanssa tehty paljon 
yhteistyötä ja sitten myös kun mä oon mediassa esillä ja ottanut myös 
itsekin esiin niin kuin asian, niin sitä kautta on tullut yhteydenottoja jopa 
euroopan tasolla” (Interview D1, 2014) 
”ulkoministeriö pyysi mut edustamaan suomea tälläsessa roundtable 
discussion on migration and development,se oli saksassa” (Interview D5, 
2014) 
Footholders were often representing not only the diaspora associations, but also the 
institutions they were associated with. For example, one of the footholders was strongly 
promoting gender equality in the agenda. They saw that they had been able to affect the 
agenda not only because of their voluntary work, but mainly because of their position in 
the working sphere.  
 
‘Spokespersons’ referred to voluntarily associated people who have been functioning as 
a contact points between the diaspora communities and the establishing function 
holders. They aim to function as intermediates between the African diaspora 
communities and the government of Finland. They acknowledged that the actual 
presence of diaspora representatives was needed in the agenda setting and accepted the 
invitations to participate as a voice for African diaspora. The spokespersons promoted 
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strongly the use of diaspora-expertise in future development work as well as the need to 
include diaspora in the decision making: 
“Nyt tää diaspora issue. Me nähdään että nyt meidän itse pitäisi kertoa tää 
asia, ei kolmas henkilö voi kertoa. Ja kun me osallistetaan afrikkalaisia 
diasporia täällä suomessa ja aktiivisesti ollaan edistämässä keskustelua, 
ollaan mukana, tällä tavalla voidaan vaikuttaa. ” (Interview D2, 2014) 
I: ”Sitten jos miettii tätä Post-2015, niin ketä oot näissä konsultaatioissa 
kokenut että sä edustat?”     
D2: ”Joo suomessa edustan koko diasporaa, huolimatta mistä kotoisin” 
(Interview D2, 2014) 
However, the spokespersons were represented in small numbers: ”Mut heitä ei oo 
paljon, se on tällänen valikoitunut porukka joka on kiinnostunut näistä asioista ja 
aktiivisesti edistää näitä kysymyksiä”. (Interview D5, 2014) They felt mandated by the 
diaspora associations. Although these advocates were representing the entire African 
diaspora, there were many African diaspora members who had never heard about the 
spokespersons or their associations.  
 
The ‘patronized’ refers to people who feel that they didn’t have enough opportunities to 
participate. The patronized were not informed of the existence of a spokesperson, who 
claimed to be speaking as the diaspora’s voice. They perceive themselves as 
underrepresented and marginalized in the agenda setting: 
“That’s what I’m talking, it’s called patronising, we don’t want to be 
patronised, we want to be involved.  You don’t bring two African and say 
they are the diaspora --- okay, so this (name of a person X) I have met once 
is with the ministry for foreign affairs, apparently one of these people that 
have been brought into this patronising, that you bring one guy and then 
diaspora is involved. That’s prestigious. That’s a thing we need to address. 
We are over 800 000 immigrants in Finland and you got one in the ministry 
and you say wow that’s achievement. No please. I don’t think its 
achievement” (Interview D3, 2014) 
I have realized I’m not being used to the maximum of my ability and I’m 
not being mandatory. (Interview D3, 2014) 
There was a clear distinction between the spokespersons, footholders and the 
patronized. The patronized preferred to use English rather than Finnish when being 
interviewed. The integration in society is often measured by the use of the local 
languages. In the case of patronized, the interviewees had lived in Finland for several 
years, yet preferred not to use Finnish. More analysis could be done considering the role 
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of language in deliberation. This will be briefly addressed in the next chapter when 
introducing some of the hindering factors 
 
Rather than creating one typification of a standard African diaspora representative, I 
trust the use of these categories can be useful when considering the type of a diaspora 
representative willing to participate. The characterization shows that there were some 
distinct differences considering the diaspora motivations and self-reflected roles in the 
post-2015 process. 
 
Though the motivations articulated between the focus groups varied, all the participants 
highlighted that the “added value of diaspora” is not fully harnessed. All the 
interviewees saw that embodying diaspora in development cooperation would help their 
countries of origins to achieve a “real difference”. The added value for involving 
diaspora in development was mentioned by all of the participants, but there was 
different emphasis on what this added value meant to them. Most often, the added value 
was described as an expertise that diaspora was holding:  
“African diaspora has an expert voice and we need to use it because we 
have a lot, doctors, lawyers, in medical science and in information there is 
lot of things going on- as well as the local knowhow” (Interview D3, 2014)  
“diaspora on niitä jotka tuntee kentän tuntee kielen, kulttuurin ja pystyy 
myös vaikuttamaan asenteisiin siellä kentällä koska ne on niin kuin osana 
siellä yhteisöä, että diaspora pystyy tekemään sitä muutosta oikeasti” 
(Interview D1, 2014) 
This expertise was seen as differentiating diaspora from the native Finns. In 
addition, trust building and functioning in more fragile states was also mentioned: 
 “when you go to developmental country one thing you need is trust, when 
taking on account the colonial past people are very reluctant to just advice 
value to believe what you say” (Interview D3, 2014) 
 “in the fragile states or to sustain peace, you need a collaborative force, you 
need the diaspora, especially those who have left the fragile countries out of 
instability who have settled. They need to be part of that process” (Interview 
D4, 2014) 
One of the footholders saw the added value of involving diaspora in development 
mainly enhancing the integration of diaspora groups into Finnish societies.  
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 “Tosta lisäarvosta mä toistan että se ei oo kauheen helppo kysymys -- eli 
jos on lisäarvo mä nään että se on tämä, et diasporan aktivoiminen oikeesti 
edistää ihmisten integroitumista”. (Interview D5, 2014) 
The footholders, spokespersons and patronized all described different experiences of 
their participation. The footholders were given opportunities due to their positions of 
work and advocacy life, but did not necessarily seek to participate in the post-2015 
agenda setting. The spokespersons were eager to voice their agenda, and the patronized 
were left unheard. These results suggest that in order to enhance the participation of 
those who feel most marginalized, special attention should be placed on how to involve 
those not normally active in traditional political arenas and decision making.  
5.1.2 Hindering factors for participation  
Deliberative theory has been seen as biased towards groups that have been historically 
disadvantaged such as “the poor, ethnic minorities and women” (Miller, 2006). Some 
reasons why people do not participate in deliberation have been listed to include themes 
such as lack of awareness, lack of council response, and issues of social exclusion.  The 
diaspora representatives interviewed were able to identify hindering factors for diaspora 
participation.  
 
There was a general sense among many involved in my research focus group that most 
of the diaspora members “had no clue” what the post-2015 consultations actually 
considered. This signals that the social exclusion was also relevant in this study. The 
most active in the consultations were those who had formed ties between the 
establishing stakeholders. As critics of deliberation claim, those who participate in 
deliberative forums are often the same educated, articulated, and economically 
advantaged individuals who also have an easy access for traditional sites of political 
power (Sanders 1997) (Young 2000)  (Curato ja Niemeyer 2013). This criticism is in 
line with the reflections of this study. In addition to social exclusion, hindering factors 
related to voluntarism and information blockage will be introduced. 
 
“Voluntary work does not pay the bills”  
The question of time and income was present in all of the interviews, and turned out to 
be one of the hindering factors for participation. Participation to deliberative 
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consultation is a voluntary choice. If consultations would be compulsory, it would 
completely change the nature of the deliberative forums. The individual freedom comes 
with some difficulties. Being an active diaspora community member is often a voluntary 
position. Integration to Finland, its culture and work life is a long and demanding 
process and not everyone is able to devote time for voluntary work: 
”He [diaspora] eivät näe että se on tärkeä, heillä on muita tärkeämpiä asioita 
ja varsinkin kun diaspora ei oo samanlaisia täällä suomessa. Jotkut tulee 
vaan naimisin menon takia, heillä ehkä työllistää paljon perhe, jotkut viel 
taistelee tästä paperien kanssa, jotkut heillä ei ole papereita, vaan oleskelee 
täällä suomessa”. (Interview D1, 2014) 
“If I was given 2 weeks to spend with Kepa [development NGO] or 2 weeks 
in airport parking lounge, I would do that because that brings my lunch 
because Kepa does not bring my launch. – Family first -- I told Kepa you 
need to create a system of participatory interest, how do you make people 
participated, what motivates me.” (Interview D3, 2014) 
The above quote highlights the struggle diaspora members’ experience, when balancing 
between the working life and the voluntary affiliations. The question of money is not 
the only one; voluntarism can also cause problems with time management: 
“Mutta jos puhutaan kehitysyhteistyöstä, tässäkin on yksi ongelma, kato tää 
on vapaaehtoinen, muillakin on kiireitä, mulla on väitöskirja ja artikkelia ja 
joku toinen heillä on oma, mutta yritetään edelleenkin että suomen systeemi, 
miten autetaan maahanmuuttajajärjestöjä, siitä pitäisi vähän keskustella --- 
(Interview D2, 2014) 
There was a tendency of responsibilities to accumulate only for selected few. This 
caused a problem with double roles. The footholders especially struggled to identify 
who they were representing,  and if they were speaking as a member of a board or as an 
individual diaspora member; “Tässähän on hieman skitsofreeninen olo että mitä vastata” 
(Interview D5, 2014) and other person explained how these double roles lead to a 
problematic situations: 
“So what happened there was a clash of interest, they were basically doing 
the same thing most of the time. It was a difficult to define her role. Being 
one and the other, she always collated them, that was very problematic.” 
(Interview D4, 2014) 
Voluntary immigrant associations also struggle to find gender balance. Cultures may 
prohibit women from participating or women might be seen as too busy taking care of 
the duties at home.  
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”Joo kyllä se on ihan niin kuin kaikki meidän jäsenjärjestöt, jäseniä on myös 
löytyy naisia, mutta siinä se että miehet on aktiivisempia kuin naiset. Että 
siinä mielessä pikkuhiljaa on välillä tullut, mutta sitten että ihmisellä on 
välillä muitakin kiireitä mutta sitten se myös kulttuuri vaikuttaa ja se että 
miehet on myös enemmän järjestössä mukana kuin naiset, mutta kyllä 
pikkuhiljaa on tullut mukana -- vaikka välillä tuntuu kentällä että ainut 
nainen siinä joukossa.” (Interview D1, 2014) 
The link between the nature of post-2015 consultation being voluntary and the struggle 
of diaspora representatives between voluntary work and paid labor are relevant issues 
when considering the prospects for participation. Having said that the unemployment 
rates amongst immigrants is almost double of native Finns8. Involving diaspora 
representative to work within traditional NGOs rather than hiring native Finns was 
proposed as a solution to further engage diaspora members.  
 
Finland has been seen as a 'land of associations'. In order to gain any funding from the 
Finnish officials, a formal organization needs to be established. Formal organizations 
had a voice in the agenda setting that individual actors did not pose in the post-2015 
consultation process.  The diaspora organizations are still considered as marginalized 
and small:  
”Me ollaan vieläkin marginaalia, meillä on tosi pienet diasporayhteisöt 
Eurooppaan verrattuna ja siinä mielessä nää asiat ei välttämättä näy yhtä 
vahvasti suomalaisessa kehitysyhteistyössä”. (Interview D5, 2014) 
This power play between bigger and smaller organizations has also been addressed in 
many of the participatory theories. The domination of bigger organizations towards 
smaller ones was evident when talking with the focus groups: 
“Joo se on suomessa aina ongelma että nostetaan näitä isoja järjestöjä ja 
unohdetaan näitä pieniä järjestöjä jotka ei sitä niinkuin näkyvissä”.  
(Interview D2, 2014) 
”Se on vaan niin se että jos UM järjestää jonkun konferenssin ja on että 
kutsutaan nyt jotain järjestöjä mukaan et sit on se civil society kutsuttu 
mukaan, mut ku se menee aina nää niinku tavallaan näihin vakiintuneihin 
järjestöjen kautta paitsi voisko sitten ollakin että kutsuisi yksittäisiä 
henkilöitä?” (Interview Kehys, 2014) 
”Mutta nää pienet järjestöt heillä ei ole mitään annettavaa tässä koska 
järjestöt tarvitsevat resursseja, enemmän resursseja, capacity building ja 
                                                 
8 In 2012 statistic shows that out of immigrants 63,8 were employed and 14,2 unemployed, comparison to 
native Finns out of 69.6 employed, 7,5 unemployed. Source: (TEM 2014) 
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monta asiaa pitäisi järjestää tässä että ihmiset herää ja nousee omat rights ja 
puhua omaa oikeutta, mutta ne, jos ei heti anneta sitten nämä järjestöt se on 
vaan nimiä ja ne kuolee jossain vaiheessa ja sitten tulee uusia voimavaroja 
jotka alottaa ihan alusta ja sitten taas woop. Mutta nyt nyt pitäisi vähän 
suunnitella että okei. Aloitetaanko tästä, vai keskustellaanko tyhjää, tässä on 
tyhjää, ei mene tähän eikä eikä tässäkin vaikka ryhmät on vähän laihasti 
keskustellut, mutta päätöksentekijät on vaan muutama henkilö” (Interview 
D2, 2014) 
Information blockage  
A relevant question when addressing the deliberation of a process is how informed the 
participants have been. John Gastil talks about “enlightened understanding” - this refers 
to a system of participation where the public becomes well informed enough to speak 
and act. Gastil criticizes the inclusive participation system where everyone has been 
given the opportunity to speak, but has not been provided any tools for gaining 
understanding of the matters under discussions. He calls for a system that would 
provide everyone tools to understand what matters they find important and chances to 
explain their views on those matters, rather than participating with systems “full of 
empty speeches” (Gastil, 2008, pp. 4-10). Ordinary African diaspora was claimed to 
lack the necessary understanding of the post-2015 process. The focus group interviewed 
claimed that most of the African diaspora had ”no clue” what the post-2015 agenda 
setting consisted of: 
”Kolikon toisella puolella on diasporayhteisöjen oma tietämättömyys näistä 
olemassa olevista mahdollisuuksista, siis porukka ei vaan tiedä -- tää on 
ensisijainen ongelma, ja mä en halua korostaa jotenkin mun omaa asemaa, 
mutta jos mulla ei oo tietoa mistä papereista puhutaan siis mä oon aivan 
varma että 99,8% muista diaspora yhteisöjen edustajista ei oo mitään hajua. 
Ja tän mä koen suurimpana ongelmana että ei ees pyritä tehä näitä 
kysymyksiä tietoiseksi näille diasporayhteisöille, ei mitään pyrkimyksiä, 
puhumattakaan kuinka paljon ollaan osallistettu diasporayhteisöjä näiden 
papereiden kirjauksessa. Ehkä Kepa ja Kehys on siihen päässyt 
vaikuttamaan, näitä vaikutusvaltaisempia isompia perinteisiä järjestöjä ja ei 
mitään pahaa heistä se on hyvä rooli että pääsee vaikuttamaan, mut nää 
diasporayhteisöt joilla on jopa välittömämpiä kontakteja näihin 
kehitysmaihin, niillä ei oo mitään kontaktia siihen mitä tapahtuu.” 
(Interview D5, 2014) 
One of the core issues considered to be hindering the participation of diaspora members 
in post-2015 consultations was the lack of information. The interviewees were often 
frustrated by the Finnish failing to reach out government reaching out for diaspora 
associations. As the above quote states the interviewee views the ultimate problem 
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being that there had been no efforts to include the diaspora communities in the post-
2015 agenda setting process. This can be seen as a form of social exclusion.  
 
When defining who is invited to the discussions, a power struggle arises (Papadoupulos, 
2012). In the post-2015 process the information has been only circulated with those 
traditional NGO actors already active in development cooperation field. Direct 
invitations for participation were sent sent only to those who have previously been 
considered as diaspora representatives. By selecting only a few representatives the 
majority of diaspora members were not been included to the agenda setting.  
 
The information blockage was seen as two-fold: the diaspora members were not aware 
of the process, while simultaneously the government was perceived as not having any 
relevant understanding of the diaspora communities: 
”Diaspora eivät tiedä että mitä tämä tarkoittaa -- ja nyt puhutaan diaspora ja 
diaspora ja ihmiset vaan hukkuu tästä, mutta kysymys ei ole näin, vaan 
miten olet hyvin mukana, miten sun näkemys näkyy tässä ja sitten 
päätöksentekijä huomaa, että okei nyt tästä meidän työryhmästä voi syntyä 
jotain työkaluja joka auttaa sitten ministeriötä” (Interview D1, 2014) 
”siis fakta on se että meidän suomen ja pohjoismaiden valtioilla ei oo 
mitään havaintoa tai tajuntaa että miten ne lähtisivät aktiivisesti aktivoimaan 
sitä omaa diaspora yhteisöä, luottavat siis näihin perinteisiin mekanismeihin 
että ulkoministeriö rahoittaa järjestöä, mutta sellainen niinku oikeesti 
aktiivinen strateginen aktivointi järjestelmä tai suunnitelma puuttuu 
kokonaan ei vaan suomen osalta vaan myös ruotsin norjan, tanskan osalta.” 
(Interview D5, 2014) 
The lack of knowledge of whom to contact and how to reach the diaspora was solved by 
placing one organization on a platform, in order to be the voice of the diaspora: The 
Finnish African Diaspora Platform for Development (FADP). When talking about the 
organization, the representative of FADP explained that they were only recently 
established and slowly starting to activate diaspora groups in Finland. The information 
of FADP’s existence had not reached all of the diaspora members interviewed. The lack 
of information sharing was not only related to the relations between the government and 
the diaspora representatives, but also within the diaspora communities themselves:  
“No I have not been hearing this African Diaspora Platform --for me it was 
new  and I’ve never seen it anywhere -- And if it is African diaspora 
platform. It to be, it doesn’t know the content -- if Somalis are active in 
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development work in Somalia so it would be a shame to have a somalian 
oriented development organization framed as African diaspora platform, 
when the focus is only one country, Africa is more than just a one country  
so that’s what I am thinking it would be interesting to know what they do 
what they development focus and which area of Africa, are they spread out, 
for me it’s a good thing.” (Interview D3, 2014) 
Diaspora being unaware of post-2015 consultations, the establishing stakeholders being 
unaware of whom to contact, one organization being framed as a representative of 
diaspora, and diaspora members unaware of the existence of this organization proved to 
be problematic. The pattern of information blockage is largely constructed by the 
consultations process. The problem can be tracked to the heterogeneity of the African 
diaspora. Harnessing a united African diaspora voice for the post-2015 agenda seems 
unrealistic when considering all the factors that cause division between the African 
diaspora: 
“Diaspora is very heterogeneous, you have to have them all, from Kenia 
from Liberia from South Africa, Namibia, Ghana from Sierra Leone from 
Egypt, from Morocco. But if you only have Somalian and Liberian and you 
say diaspora, no these guys don’t represent the voice of the diaspora they 
might have individual view they might have some insight. But what I think 
engaging diaspora is very important and engaging with very pragmatic way 
not let services patronizing.” (Interview D3, 2014) 
Africa is more than just a single country and diaspora communities are not 
homogenous. Multiple issues distinguish diaspora members from each other: timing, 
reasoning, destination, gender, social class, generation, place of residence and political 
affiliations divide the diaspora communities (Pirkkalainen, 2005, p. 35). 
”Vaikka puhun arabiaa hyvin ja arabit on mun ystäviä mutta heti ei tule 
mieleen että heitä kiinnostaa olla mukana. He ei tule, he ajattelee että on 
enemmän arabeja . [osoittaa omaa ihoaan – naurua]” (Interview D2, 2014) 
Another problem with the heterogeneity of African diaspora was that according to one 
of the interviewees, when speaking about Africa, people automatically consider Sub-
Saharan Africa. The northern Africans were not actively involved in the post-2015 
agenda setting. The language barrier seemed to be one of the problems highlighted: 
especially those arriving from French-speaking parts of Africa experienced this as a 
problem: 
"Sillon kun afrikkalaistaustaiset perustaneet järjestön niin ehkä saattaa olla 
että suomen kieli ei riittävä. Että se kieli on se haaste, että englannin kieli ei 
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kaikki pysty osallistumaan vaikka suomessa löytyy ihan kaikki viralliset 
asiat pystyy myös englannin kielellä saamaan, että ehkä mä näen että se on 
se kieli." (Interview D1, 2014) 
5.1.3 Solutions to push the diaspora agenda  
Deliberative procedures are criticized for excluding the most marginalized (Young 
2001, 2003, Miller 2006, L. Fishkin 2003, Gastil 2008). A common solution for pushing 
the diaspora agenda was evident when interviewing the focus groups. There was a 
shared understanding that African diaspora members should form coalitions in order to 
advance their participation. Yet, there was a debate as to whether the coalitions should 
follow the traditional structure of organizations, or be more flexible and based on 
“outside-the-box” thinking. 
 
Umbrella organizations  
In post-2015 process one of the most recognized diaspora associations was recently 
registered, in 20111, umbrella association The Finnish African Diaspora Platform for 
Development (FADP). The initiative originally came from the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland, based on the good experiences of Finnish-Somalia network9: 
”Ministeriöltä tuli viesti että tää suomi-somaliaverkosto nähdään että se on 
erinomainen hanke joka onnistui ja on esimerkki sitten tälle koko Euroopan 
somaliyhteisölle ja myös Afrikan diasporan sisällä ja muille 
maahanmuuttajille koska se on ensimmäisiä somalicase, hauraiden maiden 
case” (FADP representative 2014)  
FADP is aiming to enhance the diaspora cooperation and knowledge in the development 
field. It has close connections to the European African Diaspora Platform, but it is 
struggling to reach and motivate the multiple diaspora associations to register as its 
members:  
”Ja sitten yritetään yhdistää kaikki nää african diasporat täällä suomessa ja 
sitten kerrotaan suomen valtiolle että okei nyt täällä suomessa on näin 
monta afrikkalaistaustaista, hyvin koulutettua väkeä, jotka on työteliäitä, 
jotka on investoitu veronmaksajien rahoilla, mutta onko mahdollista että 
heidän järjestönsä kautta voi auttaa esimerkiksi oman kotimaansa ihmisiä.” 
(FADP representative 2014) 
                                                 
9 Founded in 2004 and registered in 2009 Finnish-Somalia network functions as a co-operative for Somali 
organizations that are involved in development cooperation projects. 
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FADP was seen as a unique tool according to Kepa and Kehys, in order to hear the 
voices of diaspora people. The representative of the platform had been invited to 
participate in discussions considering immigration and development organized by Kepa. 
FADP is not the first umbrella organization collecting the voices of diaspora members, 
but it is the first association specifically focusing on development issues. The African 
Civil Society Association had earlier aimed to be the uniform and unified African voice: 
“We had the African civil society an umbrella association of Africans in the 
diaspora in the Finnish diaspora so we tried to create a uniformed African 
voice, that did not work a much because African diaspora is very 
heterogeneous as much as the immigrant is. And one of the problem was to 
come together with a common strategy, common plan, common agenda, but 
that was very difficult” (Interview D3, 2014) 
Despite these difficulties of creating a unified voice, FADP aims to represent African 
diaspora in the field of development. The future vision of the organization aims to 
involve a variety of actors, in addition to encouraging native Finnish actors to work 
alongside them.  Unfortunately the initiative seemed to be rather unknown amongst 
other diaspora members and was also criticised of relying too much on the formal 
structures, thus only attracting diaspora members who already were active:  
Interviewer: ”Näätkö sä että tämmönen umbrella sateenvarjo organisaatio 
voi toimia?        
D5: ”Ei, sori että mä oon näin tyly, mutta ei ei, on tosi hyvä että näitä 
järjestöjä on olemassa, älä ymmärrä muo väärin, on tosi mahtava koska ne 
pystyy vaikuttamaan tietyissä kysymyksissä erittäin hienosti ja ne edistää 
myös niinku sitä demokraattisempaa tapaa toimia, järjestö joka toimii 
sääntöjen mukaisesti ja edistää osallistumista ja osallistamista. Mutta mä 
koen että niiden toimintamahdollisuudet on aika rajalliset tietyissä 
kysymyksissä. -- Afrikkalaistaustaisesta diasporasta ei vaan suomessa vaan 
myös muualla euroopassa, se on ottanut tällänen hyvin perinteinen linja, 
mennään niinku formaaliseen organisoitumiskaavan mukaan, ensin 
perustetaan joku yhdistys ja pyritään sen kautta vaikuttamaan  -- mutta se 
reitti on hyvin kapea ja se ei sovi kaikille,” (Interview D5, 2014) 
Cooperation over boarders  
Internationally, Finland has had representatives of diaspora members attending to 
international seminars relating to themes of diaspora and development. The ‘diaspora & 
roundtable’ meeting organized in 201310 had representatives from the Finnish Syrian 
                                                 
10 27-28.7.2013 Eschborn, Germany. Diaspora & Developmen Roundtable. Preparing for the 2013 UN 
High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. 
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Friendship Association, Ministry for Interior, and from the Finnish African Diaspora 
Platform for Development. The Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) 
2014 organized in Sweden in May resulted a formation of a new Nordic Working Group 
on migration and development. A Finnish representative of the working group -one of 
the footholders interviewed, described how the Nordic Working Group as aiming to 
empowered the African diaspora communities to work within development processes: 
”Päätettiin ainakin käynnistää dialogi prosessi johon kutsuttaisiin 
pohjoismaiden afrikkalaisdiasporan edustajia keskustelemaan ensinnäkin 
keinoista joita lähtisimme vaikuttamaan juuri näihin kysymyksiin että miten 
valtiot tulisi aktivoimaan diaspora yhteisöjä ja sit toiseksi, miten 
mahdollistaisimme afrikkalaisdiasporan mahdollisuuksia tehdä jotain 
konkreettisia hyödyllisiä hankkeita omissa kotimaissaan” (Member of 
Nordic Working Group, 2014) 
Irrespective, The Nordic Working Group seems to be fairly exclusive ”Toistaiseksi tää 
on pidetty silleen niinku pienenä ja omana juttuna”. It does not aim to function as an 
umbrella organization, but rather sees itself as a new initiative hoping to establish 
diaspora ”hubs” or other innovative coalitions that would work outside the ordinary 
framework, and so, better unleash the potential of diasporas. 
 
The first part of this analysis has provided a typification of three different participation 
experiences. It entails that those who are already active in politics, and well integrated 
within Finnish society, tend to be given more opportunities for participation. Those less 
active are not actively recruited. The language barrier could be seen as a paralyzing 
factor that leads to information blockage.  
5.2 Diasporic identity  
The first part of the analysis referred to the African diaspora’s self-reflected experiences 
of the participation. The second part of the analysis will focus to an understanding of 
diasporic identity. Whereas identities are always constructed and hence imply subjective 
interpretations, this chapter aims to expand the analysis to cover institutional 
interpretations. This chapter answers the question: ”How did an understanding of 
‘diasporic’-identity influence the deliberative nature of the post-2015 agenda setting in 
Finland?”. 
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A prominent political theorist John Dryzek has stressed the importance of discursive 
designs. Discourse can be seen “as a set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides 
its adherents with framework for making sense of situations and embodying judgments” 
(2006, p. 1) As discourses are, according to Dryzek, social as well as personal, they do 
affect to the behavior of individuals and institutions that advocate them. (2000, p. 121) 
During the research process there was a strong discourse that emerged: this “diaspora 
discourse” aims to frame how diaspora was being defined, and who were considered as 
diaspora members in Finland.  I have included to this discourse not only the reflections 
of the diaspora communities, but also the reflections of the establishing stakeholders of 
the post-2015 agenda. The discourse reveals attitudes towards diaspora and the activity 
of diaspora communities in Finland, and can be labeled as a ‘diasporic-identity’. The 
diaspora-discourse functioned as a mechanism to include and exclude participants in the 
post-2015 agenda setting. For this research a desk study and some consultations were 
undertaken to understand the current conversations surrounding the term in Finland. I 
will briefly introduce you these findings before the introduction of the discursive 
profiles. 
 
Conversations around the term ‘diaspora’ in Finland 
A desk study revealed that during the time of the research, “diaspora” as a term was 
discussed in multiple forums. The Development Policy Committee (KPT) in Finland 
had placed recommendations that instead of using the term “immigration”  it should be 
replace with a term “diaspora”. KPT saw that by using the term diaspora it would 
remind people of the strong links immigrants hold to their home countries. (KPT, 2014) 
A member of KPT, professor Liisa Laakso emphasized the use of the term “diaspora” in 
research as well as in the use of media. Laakso had experienced difficulties when 
wishing to publish articles containing the word “diaspora” in daily media. The media 
had claimed the term to alienate the general public from the topic: 
”Valitettavasti suomalainen media ei vielä näytä hyväksyvän diaspora-sanan 
käyttöä, vaikka kyse onkin vanhasta sivistyssanasta. Olen itse saanut 
toimituksista palautetta, jonka mukaan käsite ”vieraannuttaa” lukijan. ---
Toki diaspora-termiinkin liittyy ongelmia, joista hankkeissamme 
keskusteltiinkin – esimerkiksi sen historiallinen liittäminen vain 
juutalaisdiasporaan. Kokonaisarviomme kuitenkin oli, että diasporan käsite 
on jo laajentunut tavalla, jota omien tutkimustemme oli syytä tukea. Käsite 
nostaa esille entisen kotimaan tilanteen ja siitä kumpuavat velvoitteet aivan 
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eri tavalla kuin vaikkapa maahanmuuttaja, jossa huomio kohdistuu uuteen 
kotimaahan sopeutumiseen.” (Laakso, 2014) 
The Finnish NGO Platform Kepa in summer 2014 added a new immigration trend to its 
strategy. This trend will strengthen the participation of the immigrant associations in 
development cooperation and promotes their willingness to act as a voice for 
developing countries. Despite the recommendations of KPT, Kepa decided to use the 
wording “immigrant” rather than “diaspora” , which they perceived to be too loosely-
defined to be used. 
“Kepan hallituksen osalta kyse oli paremminkin oikeakielisyydestä ja 
selkeydestä:  hallitus koki että diaspora terminä on vieraskielinen eikä vielä 
niin vakiintunut ja kaikkien ymmärtämä, että sitä kannattaisi käyttää 
strategiassa, joskin osa olisi ollut valmis vaihtamaan termiä 
maahanmuuttajista diasporaan.” (email July 18.2014 KEPA) 
5.2.1 Who belongs to Diaspora? 
As the debate of wording continues, the understanding of the term differs. Defining the 
term “diaspora” was not clear for the focus group of this research. Even though it was 
easy for the interviewees with an immigrant background to identify themselves as 
diaspora representatives, making distinctions of who belongs and who does not belong 
under the category was difficult: ”Kun puhutaan Afrikkalaisesta diasporasta se on niin 
heterogeeninen et välillä on vaikea edes sanoa että kuka kuuluu siihen diasporaan ja 
kuka ei kuuluu” (Interview D5, 2014). 
 
I will now present three very different interpretations of defining the diaspora. The first 
interpretation is the most flexible one: it states that anyone out of their home country is 
considered as diaspora: “For me, the summary for diaspora would be just people who 
find themselves from another land” (Interview D4, 2014).  According to this flexible 
definition, any immigrant in any phase of the immigration could be considered as a 
diaspora member.  
 
The second definition of the term prefers diaspora to be considered as the immigrants 
who have successfully integrated in to the host society. It eliminates immigrants who 
have not yet integrated: “Heti kun tulee hän ei ole vielä diaspora koska hän ei tiedä, 
hänen pitää ensin oppia suomenkieltä ja että on kotoutunut ja tietää ja seuraa uutisetkin. 
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(Interview D2 2014). In addition, a similar explanation was provided, but only linked 
diaspora to immigrants who do not maintain strong links with their country of origin. If 
the links are missing, the integrated immigrant is no longer considered as part of 
diaspora, but as a Finn. 
 
A third, more exclusive version, described diaspora to include only those with expert 
experiences and daily contacts to the country of origin. This was most used by the 
footholders as well as the establishing stakeholders: 
”Diasporalla mä tarkoitan ihan niinku niitä joilta osaamista löytyy, ei vaan 
että kuka tahansa voisi kutsua kokoukseen vaan niitä joilla on kokemuksia 
ja jopa niinku ihan kontaktia siellä, päivittäin. Ehkä se [diaspora termi] on 
vähän niinku hakusessa.” (Interview D2, 2014)  
A common aspect provided by all three versions when defining diaspora is that diaspora 
maintains connections to the home country or country of origin. In many of the 
definitions, the more active an immigrant, the better diaspora representative he/she was 
considered to be: 
 ”Se on täydellinen diaspora esimerkki, ihmiset jotka vaikuttaa tähän 
yhteiskuntaan ja sinne lähtömaahan jotka tekee niinku yhteistyötä 
molempien valtioiden kanssa ja muiden yhteistyötahojen kanssa.” 
(Interview D5, 2014) 
The African diaspora in Finland is very heterogeneous. The diaspora members arriving 
from fragile states were expected to have received more attention and support than those 
who arrived from more peaceful states. The diaspora advocacy studies claim that often 
those members, who have experienced existential threats, are most active in diaspora 
advocacy. (Newland, 2010, s. 5) This was challenged by the interviewees who claimed 
that despite Somalis are often seen as the most active diaspora, also other African 
diasporas are active, but often fail to make it to the headlines: 
”Tää fragile state, hauraat valtiot diaspora tuntuu olevan paljon 
aktiivisempia kun he tulevat hauraista valtioista, Somalia on täydellinen 
esimerkki, porukka on pakotettu aktivoitumaan kun heidän kotimaantilanne 
on mikä on, mutta sitten kun kenialaiset ghanalaiset, nigerialaiset, 
eteläafrikkalaiset, he tekevät aika paljon mutta se ei välttämättä näy, se ei 
pääse välttämättä otsikkoihin.” (Interview D5, 2014) 
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Defining diaspora was not something the focus groups willingly did. For those whom 
considered themselves as diaspora representatives, there was a fear of creating 
impressions that would exclude some actors if it was too narrowly defined:  
”Tää diaspora termi, se pitää tarkistella, että kuka on diaspora? Me 
ajatellaan että diaspora, ei oo hyvin kirjoitettu ja emmä halua nyt kirjoittaa 
meidän paperia että diaspora näin ja näin , että et saa sitten jäseniä 
[naurua].” (Interview D2, 2014) 
5.2.2 Migrant- versus diaspora-discourse  
The diaspora discourse from the establishing actors of the agenda was often fused with 
the “migrant discourse”. When referring to migrants, the actors emphasized that 
immigration to Finland was still quite “young” compared to the volumous European 
level. They often used this premise to explain the lack of participation from immigrant 
associations. Many diaspora communities were seen as primarily enhancing their 
integration in Finnish society, and only afterwards starting to activate politically.:  
”Aika monet maahanmuuttojärjestöt keskittyy tähän kotouttamiseen  mikä 
on ymmärrettävää kun on aika nuorta tää maahanmuutto, että se että lähtee 
niinku poliittiseen vaikuttamiseen niin se vie vähän aikaa” (Interview D5, 
2014) 
Because of this fusion, and the strong conception of immigrants, diaspora was often 
immediately linked with immigration themes. This explains why in the post-2015 
agenda setting diaspora representatives were consulted mainly on immigration matters. 
When enquiring whether diaspora would have had something to say with topics such as 
“Conflicts and fragility”, “Safety and development”, “Human rights”, “Gender” or  
“Finances”, the establishing stakeholders agreed that it could have been important to 
include diaspora also in other besides immigration: 
Kehys: Meillähän Kehys vetää myös semmosta turvallisuus ja kehitys 
työryhmää ja siellähän nyt näitä hauraat valtiot tematiikka on pyöritelty. 
I: onks siellä noussut diaspora agenda esille? 
Kehys: mun mielestä kyl ei et se on vaan niin sitä... et kyllä se ois yks 
semmonen paikka sit missä vois miettiä… justiin se että ajatellaan että 
[diaspora] ei oo pelkästään siirtolaisuusasioiden asiantuntijoita just niinku 
turvallisuuden ja ruokaturvan et he niinku tuntee sen maan olot parhaiten. 
(Interview Kehys, 2014) 
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Diaspora-discourse was easily adopted by the establishing actors of the agenda when 
referring to Somalis. Somali diaspora was seen as an example of an active diaspora. 
Overall, diaspora-discourse was utilized more by the immigrants than by Finnish 
natives. The establishing stakeholders interviewed tended to automatically associate 
diaspora with migration themes. 
 
The fact that the “diaspora” term was not yet well grounded in the Finnish society 
allowed the term to be viewed as a tool to reframe and brand, immigration with more 
positive nuances:  
”Koska tää termi diaspora on nyt tullut niin se on myöskin mahollisuus 
brändätä tätä teema eritavalla, koska maahanmuuttokeskustelu on tavallaan 
aika ongelmallinen tällä hetkellä--- siitä voisi rakentaa jotain 
positiivisempaa” (Interview D5, 2014) 
The use of these two different discourses in the deliberation process did influence the 
inclusion and exclusion of the stakeholders. As the establishing stakeholders were in the 
position of coordinating the agenda setting, and functioned on the premise of their own 
understanding of the immigrant discourse, were immigrants only included in the 
discussions considering immigration. The diaspora representatives on the other side 
were left unsatisfied as they were not identified according to their diaspora discourse 
that highlighted their expertise in multiple sectors. Though these two discourses did 
collapse during the agenda setting as seen in the next chapter, the deeply rooted  
perceptions of migrant-discourse excluded immigrants from participating to other 
thematic areas of the consultations.  
5.2.3 Diaspora discourse on post-2015 agenda  
The diaspora discourse for the post-2015 agenda setting in Finland was utilized on a 
grassroots level, but some of the individuals in the coordinating level at he Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs were unaware of the discourse.  
I: Nouseeko näissä post-2015 keskusteluissa laisinkaan termi diaspora esiin? 
MFA: Mä luulen et se on joissain ei hirveesti, siis siirtolaisuudestahan 
puhutaan jonku verran et se oli niinku viimeviikolla mutta tuota mun 
mielestä se ei oo hirveesti sieltä se diaspora kummunnut, joissain 
yhteyksissä kyllä mainittu mutta en nyt muista missä.                       
I: Entä jos nyt miettii maahanmuuttajajärjestöjä suomessa, onko tullut 
selkeästi esille että he ois joissain teemoissa ollut aktiivisia?                  
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MFA: ei, ei ainakaan sinä aikana kun mä olen ollut” (Interview MFA , 
2014) 
The high-level positions Finland had during the agenda setting could have provided 
excellent platforms to push the diaspora voices to the global agenda.  
 
On January 17th 2014, Minister Pekka Haavisto was elected as a chairman for IDPS11, 
an international network promoting the development of fragile states. Haavisto stated 
that one important task of IDPS is to incorporate questions of peace and stability in the 
UN’s post-2015 development goals: “This chairmanship provides an opportunity to 
solve problems together with fragile states. One important task is to incorporate 
questions of peace and stability prominently in the UN’s post-2015 development 
goals.  ” Haavisto stresses (Formin, 2014b). 
 
Throughout the interviews the participants reflected that Development Minister Pekka 
Haavisto had been actively promoting the role of diaspora in development, and he was 
seen as “in favor of African” (Interview D2, 2014). Despite the rhetoric, there was no 
mechanism placed to guarantee that the voice and practical participation of diasporas 
would have been involved to the Finnish views:  
”tottakai Pekalla [Haavisto] on paljon tietoa ja paljon isoja verkostoja missä 
hän itse myös saamaan ihan tietoja mutta se sitten toinen asia joka puuttuu 
että se diasporan rooli, miten se sitten siinä päätöksenteon prosessissa on 
mukana, se on vähän hakusessa.” (Interview D1, 2014) 
”mutta se on joo se on yksi asia vaikka Haavisto on sitä mieltä että diasporat 
mukaan, pitäisi saada joku instrumentti että pitäisi saada enemmön 
instrumenttia, työkaluja joka mahdollistaisi että diaspora osallistetaan, koska 
nyt koko aika puhutaan retoriikka mutta vain puheita ja hyviä puheita, mutta 
konkreettisesti me halutaan saada jotain osallistavaa, miten, ja tää on ihan 
kokonaan ei ole suomessa, ei ole”. (Interview D2, 2014) 
 “mut silleen mä mietin että kun tää on nyt toi kehitysministeri Pekka 
Haavistolle nää on nää diaspora asiat ihan hirveen rakkaita ja tärkeitä ja hän 
ainakin mitä itse on kuullut niin joka puhe mitä hän pitää niin hän muistaa 
niinku sanoa nää diaspora ja ihan esimerkkinä nää suomen somalit ja todella 
että sitä täytyisi vahvistaa sitä heidän osallistumista ja käyttää hyödyksi ja 
että silleen aattelis että jos ministeri yhtään pääse vaikuttamaan tähän 
Suomen kantoihin sen ehkä toivois vielä näkyvän, että ehkä heittäis sitä 
palloa sinne vähän sinne UM:n puolellekin.” (Interview Kehys, 2014) 
                                                 
11 International Dialoque on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
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The Global Thematic Consultations on “Conflict, Violence and Disaster” Finland was 
co-chairing, and could have provided a great platform to also include diaspora 
representatives in discussions. The final Global Consultation arranged in Helsinki in 
March 2013 did not include any diaspora representatives. 
 
Another Finnish official, Ambassador Pertti Majanen was elected to co-chair the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Financing Committee. This has been described as a 
unique opportunity for Finland to be involved in shaping global development (Formin, 
2013c). Though the final report of the committee addressed the role of migrants’ 
remittances in financing development, diaspora representatives interviewed were not 
involved to participate in topics related to finances and were not aware that any diaspora 
representatives would have been approached regarding the themes: 
”UM:n puolella on paljon vaikeampi sitten että pääsis vaikuttamaan vähän 
niinku sitten siihen politiikkaan, en nyt tiiä, mut et heitä [diaspora] 
käytettäis oikeesti siinä niinku kehitysyhteistyön asiantuntijoina ja olis siinä 
enemmän niinku suunnittelemassa ja yhteistyössä siinä kaikessa mukana, 
niin ei se niinku siellä puolella oikein toimi, ja toki se on niinku vähän 
jäykkä organisaatio kun on tää diplomaatti mylly joka siellä pyörii -- että 
tuntuu että sinne on niinku vähän, kauniista puheista huolimatta, hienoja 
papereita ja puheita pidetään mutta sitten oikeesti.” (Interview Kehys, 2014) 
Stakeholder representation may be deliberate, but not necessarily democratic. When 
defining who will be selected as a convenient stakeholder and who should be invited to 
the discussions, is according to Papadouplos (2012), a matter of power struggle. 
Stakeholder led processes often leads to heterogeneity and includes the 'non-
mainstream' actors. (2012, p. 134).  
 
The findings reveal that one particular diaspora association was seen as a relevant 
stakeholder, and thus was invited to the national level of consultations. The Finnish 
African Diaspora Platform for Development acted as a voice for the African diaspora in 
Finland. FADP had received invitations to join the national stakeholder hearings a 
gathering were national discussions were conducted. FADP was not part of the national 
post-2015 working group, which was established in Spring 2014. The national working 
group did not have any diaspora representatives. Likewise, neither FAD,P nor other 
diaspora associations, were not represented in the Civil Society Task Force for post-
2015.  
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”Task Forcessa ei oo varsinaisesti diaspora järjestöä. Mutta me ollaan tehty 
sellainen työnjako että erityisesti maahanmuuttokysymyksissä Kehyksellä 
on sellainen työryhmä, että he koordinoi ja yrittää olla perustamatta mitää 
uusia rakenteita tai työryhmiä ja taas sitä kautta siellä aktiivisia olevat 
järjestöt ja niin taas se heidän asiantuntemus kanavoituu sieltä sitä kautta ja 
saa tietoo täst prosessista -- en mä nää näissä diaspora tai 
maahanmuuttajakysymyksissä että mä olisin edes oikea ihminen puhumaan 
niistä. Et sen takia näitä kantapapereita me ollaan koordinoitu siinä 
Kehyksen vetämässä työryhmässä, et mä oon vaan välittänyt [FADP:lle] 
niitä tietoja et huomenna ois tämmönen kokous, tai et UM:llä ois tällänen 
kuuleminen, et meetko sinne ja voisitko briiffaa heitä sit sielt kokouksesta 
missä sä oot ite käynyt ja ne teidän kannoista ja näin et musta tuntuis tosi 
oudolta puhuu jotenkin heidän äänellään”. ( Interview KEPA, 2014) 
The diaspora views in Finland were represented in the paper “Development 
organizations’ views on migration for post-2015 framework”.  The paper promoted that 
the agenda should see migration as a possibility, not a burden, and that diaspora 
expertise should be utilized. The paper had been circulating on the Post-2015 task force 
emailing list, and was endorsed by some of the Post-2015 task force members12. The 
positional paper was designed and based on the views of an immigration working group 
coordinated by Kehys. This immigration working group had earlier produced a position 
paper “Organizations views on UN High-Level dialogue on migration and 
development”13 in September 2013, the paper stated that: 
“Diaspora communities should be included in the development cooperation 
in both project and in executing development politics. The significance of 
diaspora communities in the peace building and rebuilding states is essential 
and is to be utilized. – The role of diaspora communities in the development 
of the world economy should be made visible. Remittances of migrants are 
multiple compared to official development aid. However, remittances are 
not the only way the diaspora communities are part of the development of 
the world economy. Diaspora communities enhance trade and direct foreign 
investments, create businesses and transfer new information and new skills. 
(Kehys, 2013b, p. 2) 
Despite good momentum, a “Summary of main views of Finland for the Post-2015 
Agenda” did not include any mention of considering the role of diasporas in the 
development cooperation. The timing of the hearings was influential, as hearings were 
scheduled very late in the process, and the “preliminary or final” decisions had already 
                                                 
12Signed by Finnish Red Cross, African Care, Kehys, Finnish Refugee Aid, Kepa, Finnish Lutheran 
Evancelical Mission, World Vision.  
13Signed by Finnish African Diaspora Platform for Development, Kehys, Monika Multicultural Women’s 
Association, Finnish Refugee Council, Finnish Red Cross, Finnish-Syria Friendship Association, Finnish 
Somalia Network and Family Federation of Finland 
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been agreed. Statements like Development organizations’ views on migration for post-
2015 framework” did not enable the diaspora to participate: rather lit let et some of them 
feeling that they had been ignored. According to the ministry representative, in order to 
push something fresh for the post-2015 agenda, it should have been done in a very early 
stage of the consultations (Interview MFA , 2014). 
 
The African diaspora voices did not echo on the national views of Finland though 
African diaspora was most visible on the post-2015 agenda setting. What was most 
striking was the lack of diaspora representatives from continents other than Africa14. 
This is most likely rooted in the fact that Finnish development cooperation is centering 
around seven long term partner countries: out of these seven five are located in the 
African continent. The African diaspora representatives interviewed for this research all 
saw added value in involving diaspora to development cooperation.  
 
A summary of the main observations concludes the analysis chapter. The first part of 
the analysis tackled the subjective reflections of the African diaspora towards the post-
2015 agenda setting. One of the main observations was that one particular actor was 
framed as the voice of the African diaspora. This was promoted by the actor itself, as 
well as from the establishing stakeholders' side. The ‘spokesperson’ was repeatedly 
criticized by the rest of the interviewed African diaspora as representing the diaspora 
without most of them being aware of this representation-relation. The ‘patronized’ felt 
that there had not been any real efforts to include the ordinary diaspora in the 
discussions. One factor hindering the African diaspora participation was the language 
barrier: the consultations were held in Finnish, and thus excluded those who were not 
comfortable with the language.  Other hindering factors limiting diaspora participation 
included socio-economic issues, such as problems with time management and income 
earning.  
 
The second part of the analysis focused on the discourses and realities created through 
these discourses. The diasporic-identity was seen problematic. For the focus groups, it 
was not clear who belongs to the diaspora, though some commonalities were to link 
diaspora and expertise. Diaspora were often perceived as highly-educated, active, self-
                                                 
14Finnish-Syria Friendship association was often mentioned as active participant in post-2015 agenda 
setting, but as the scope of this research included African diaspora, the association was not studied. 
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motivated participants, who maintained connections to their countries of origin. 
However, not all immigrants have high-educational backgrounds. The most 
marginalized are often the least educated.  When interpreted this way, it would seem 
that the exclusion of marginalized people will only continue. The different 
interpretations and understandings clearly signal that there is no solid definition for the 
term. The flexibility of the term was seen as a possibility to recreate and re-brand the 
term. There was a use of two types of discourses ‘immigrant’ versus ‘diaspora’. The use 
of these two different discourses in the deliberation process did influence the 
involvement of the African diaspora in the agenda setting. Despite the rhetoric of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and more specifically, the Development Minister at the time 
actively promoting the diaspora-discourse, the establishing stakeholders tended to use 
the immigrant discourse. Due to that African diaspora were only included in the 
discussions pertaining to immigration. The African diaspora interviewed were left 
unsatisfied, as they were not identified according to diaspora discourse that highlighted 
their expertise in multiple sectors.  
6 Conclusions and discussion 
This research focused on the role of African diaspora in the post-2015 agenda setting. 
The post-2015 agenda setting in Finland was guided by a stakeholder approach, and was 
built upon the model created for Rio+20 consultations. Impressive initiatives, such as 
the national working group for post-2015, were established and actively coordinated by 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. However, complementary hearings were not organized 
during the first-phase of the consultations. Though the agenda setting process was 
criticized due to not being visible to the public, it was applauded for activating several 
stakeholders in the discussions.  
 
Two research questions guided the research. The first research question was answered 
by providing discursive profiles that addressed the African diaspora’s own subjective 
beliefs regarding their perceived role in the post-2015 agenda setting process.  
 
1) “What were the African diaspora representatives perceived roles, self-declared 
motivations, and experienced limitations for participation, and how did they push 
their agendas in the post-2015 agenda setting?”  
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The discursive profiles were categorized as ‘spokesperson’, ‘footholders’ and 
‘patronized’. The ‘spokesperson’ represented the African diaspora in the post-2015 
agenda setting. They had established advocacy ties within the establishing stakeholders, 
and were invited to take part in discussions seen relevant to diaspora groups. 
‘Footholders’ referred to elite immigrants, having established strong advocacy ties 
within the government of Finland, often through their work positions or other 
affiliations. The ‘footholders’ did not actively claim to represent the African diaspora 
but were more interested in promoting certain agendas relevant to their positions. Those 
who felt patronized were most critical towards the post-2015 process: they felt that there 
had not been any real efforts to reach the ordinary diaspora members. They were not 
aware of ‘spokespersons’ representing their agendas, and had not authorized them to 
speak on their behalf. They criticized the process for only hearing selected 
representatives, who claimed to be speaking for the voice of an entire diaspora. 
 
As evidenced, the idea of deliberation is not perfect. Some of the factors limiting 
diaspora participation included socio-economic issues. These were often related to the 
voluntary nature of the post-2015 process and to problems with time management and 
income earning. There was a lack of information on three levels; government to 
diaspora, diaspora to government, as well as diaspora to diaspora. It was stated that 
Finnish government did not inform the diaspora communities clearly enough about the 
possibilities for participation: only few active diaspora members reached out actively to 
the government, leaving the rest of the diaspora inactive. The diaspora to diaspora 
linkage was also weak, as most of the diaspora members were unaware that there had 
been a representation of African diaspora in the discussion. 
 
Fortunately, a common solution for pushing the diaspora agenda did stand out: there 
was a shared understanding that African diaspora members should form coalitions in 
order to advance their participation. Yet, there was also a debate as to whether the 
coalitions should follow the traditional structure of organizations, or be more flexible 
and based on “outside-the-box” thinking. The most active coalition speaking for the 
African diaspora was the Finnish African Diaspora Platform for Development (FADP). 
FADP was seen as a unique tool according to Kepa and Kehys, in order to hear the 
voices of diaspora people. However, FADP was struggling to attract diaspora members. 
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It was often identified as a Sub-Saharan or a Somali-oriented organization rather than 
representing a unified African voice.  
 
The second question emerged during the research and assessed both the African 
diaspora as well as the establishing stakeholders’ understanding of a specific discourse: 
“diasporic-identity”. 
 
1) “How did an understanding of ‘diasporic’-identity influence the deliberative nature 
of the post-2015 agenda setting in Finland?” 
 
The diasporic-identity was seen as problematic. For the focus groups, it was not clear 
who belongs to diaspora. Different interpretations and understandings signaled clearly 
that there was no solid definition for the term. Furthermore, the flexibility of the term 
‘diaspora’ was seen as a possibility to recreate and re-brand the term. Diaspora was seen 
as extremely heterogeneous and unifying the diaspora to speak with one voice was often 
seen difficult. All the focus group members did link diaspora and expertise together, and 
diaspora was seen as highly-educated, active self-motivated actors who maintained 
connections to their countries of origin.  However, not all immigrants have educational 
backgrounds. The most marginalized are often the least educated, and this results in 
limited possibilities for their participation.  
 
There was a use of two types of discourses; ‘immigrant’ versus ‘diaspora’.  Despite the 
rhetoric of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and more specifically, the Development 
Minister at the time actively promoting the knowledge maintained by diaspora to be 
utilized in many sectors, the establishing stakeholders tended to immediately link 
diaspora with immigration themes. This fusion of ‘diaspora discourse’ and ‘migrant 
discourse’ explains why in the post-2015 agenda setting diaspora representatives were 
consulted mainly on immigration matters. Due to that the African diaspora interviewed 
were left unsatisfied as they were not identified according to diaspora discourse that 
highlighted their expertise in multiple sectors.  
 
In order to enhance the participation of marginalized groups in deliberation processes, 
special attention should be devoted to the matter. A more flexible, culturally sensitive 
understanding, that would allow participants with different backgrounds to participate is 
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recommended. As the findings of my study show, the language barrier was seen as  
hindering the participation. The use of different languages, whether it to be Finnish, 
Swedish, Russian, English, or French, should be considered in the future consultations 
with the aim to reach the diaspora communities. Furthermore the invitation procedure 
should be reconsidered as there are some limitations with email circulation. As the 
results of this research display, the diaspora members that actively participated in the 
agenda setting had received personal invitations from the establishing stakeholders. 
 
The validity and reliability of the research could have been increased by conducting 
more interviews. I was able to interview some of the active African diaspora 
representatives located in the capital of Finland, Helsinki area, but broader research 
could be further implemented by interviewing diaspora representatives habituating 
outside the capital area. For this research the diaspora representatives I interviewed 
were all born outside of Finland and had strong sentimental ties towards their countries 
of origin. It would be useful to assess how the second generation maintains links to the 
countries of origins of their parents in future studies.  
 
This research was conducted in-parallel to the agenda setting process. The post-2015 
agenda will be completed in September 2015. As the process was ongoing during this 
research, little research had been completed regarding this field in Finland. Further 
research could be performed by comparing the different mechanisms that enhance 
diaspora participation, for example specifically in the Nordic context. Somali-diaspora 
is the most researched diaspora in Finland, but more focus should be given to in-depth 
research within other African diasporas, as well Asian (Chinese, Thai-workers, Indian), 
Middle-Eastern (Syrian, Iraqis) and South American (Mexican, Brazilian) diasporas. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Interview Framework / 
HAASTATTELURUNKO  
Pro-Gradu: Reflecting the diaspora 
participation in Post-2015 
Nora Stenius, Helsingin Yliopisto 
 
 
 
 
 
DIASPORAN EDUSTAJA: 
 
 
 
Diaspora 
? Kuinka määrittelee termin 
diaspora? 
? Diasporan lisäarvo 
kehitysyhteistyössä? 
Kehitystavoitteet/ Post-2015 
? Milloin ja missä kuuli ensimmäisen 
kerran P2015 prosessista? 
? Miten kuvailisi P2015 prosessia 
Suomessa? 
Osallistuminen ja motivaatio 
? Miten on osallistunut? 
? Miksi on/ei ole osallistunut? 
Oma rooli (perceived roles) 
? Kokeeko että omat agendat on 
kuultu? 
? Ketä kokenut edustavansa? 
Ongelmia / Onnistumisia 
? Mikä mieltä diasporan  yleisestä 
aktiivisuudesta prosessissa, 
syy/seuraus? 
? Mitä prosessissa olisi voitu tehdä 
toisin? 
? Muita ongelmia noussut esiin? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KOORDINOIVAN TAHON 
EDUSTAJA: 
 
 
 
Diaspora 
? Kuinka määrittelee termin 
diaspora? 
? Diasporan lisäarvo 
kehitysyhteistyössä? 
Kehitystavoitteet/ Post-2015 
? ETNOn  rooli P2015 prosessissa 
? Kuinka osallistava prosessi on 
Suomessa ollut? 
Diasporan osallistuminen ja motivaatio 
? Kuinka aktiivisia diasporajärjestöt 
itse ovat? 
? Miksi diaspora on/ei ole 
osallistunut?  
Diasporan rooli  
? Mitä agendoja diasporajärjestöt 
nostaneet? 
? Suomen temaattinen panostus 
konfliktit ja väkivalta; mikä 
diasporan rooli tässä? 
Ongelmia / Onnistumisia 
? Mitä prosessissa olisi voitu tehdä 
toisin? 
? Muita ongelmia noussut esiin?  
 
 
Mitä prosessissa seuraavaksi? 
Onko jotain mitä haluaisit vielä kertoa?                  
Ketä haastatella seuraavaksi? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Interview details 
Date, Association, Place, Time 
 
03.06.2014  Finnish African Diaspora Platform for Development, Helsinki, 2:15:42 
minutes 
 
10.06.2014  Finnish Somalia Network, Helsinki, 46:09 minutes 
 
13.06.2014  Finnish Liberian Friendship Association? Helsinki, 1:16:05 minutes 
 
13.06.2014  Kehys, Helsinki, 1:01:30 minutes 
 
17.06.2014  Nordic Working Group on Migration and Development, Helsinki, 58:39 
minutes 
 
17.06.2014  KEPA, Helsinki, 47:36 minutes 
 
23.06.2014  The African Civil Society of Finland, 35:07 minutes 
 
24.06.2014  The Ministry for Foreign of Finland , Helsinki, 58:14 minutes
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